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Introduction 
 Theories of punishment seek to validate the use of punishments and maintain societal 
order. These theories can be divided into two general philosophical camps, retributivism and 
utilitarianism. Retributive justice relies on the principle of lax talionis, which requires imposing 
punishments onto a wrongdoer identical to the one imposed on the victim, to restore and respect 
the basic moral rights of all citizens. Utilitarianism condones punishment only when it 
maximizes benefits for society. Much debate surrounds which of these two camps is most 
justified in its determination of legal punishments. Although both retributivism and utilitarianism 
seem intuitive and compelling, continuous applications of both theories result in several 
unavoidably uncomfortable conclusions for utilitarianism. 
 Despite its apparent flaws, close analyses of both theories reveal that retributivism most 
closely aligns with our intuitions for appropriate punishments. Retributivism provides a basis for 
assigning punishments that aligns with our common sense intuitions of morality and prescribes 
objective guidelines for determining types of punishments. As appealing as the utilitarian’s 
appeal to maximizing benefits may be, closer analyses reveal certain uncomfortable implications 
that have detrimental consequences for utilitarianism as a feasible theory of punishment. The 
first part of my work focuses on highlighting some of the most troubling conclusions that could 
result from implementing utilitarianism as a theory of punishment. I also examine certain dualist 
theories, which attempt to combine elements of retributivism and utilitarianism, into a single 
theory of punishment. Examination of dualist theories reveals certain illogical conclusions that 
result from an attempt to reconcile two widely conflicting theories. Retributivism escapes many 
of these troublesome implications of utilitarianism.  
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Retributivism is certainly not without its flaws, but closer inspection reveals that most 
objections resolve themselves through clarification of terms used in describing retributivism 
Other objections to retributivism reveal issues that are at least as problematic for the utilitarian. 
Although these objections are worthy of eventual consideration, it is outside the scope of this 
work as solutions to these problems are not necessary to prove the strength of retributivism over 
utilitarianism. One glaring objection to retributivism that must be resolved before it is worthy of 
consideration and implementation as a feasible theory of punishment is the existence of hard 
cases, such as rape and mass murder, where direct application of the lex talionis principle seems 
difficult.   
The requirement of proportionality has some uncomfortable implications for the type of 
punishments deemed acceptable in a retributivist theory of justice. Certain forms of punishment, 
such as capital punishment and torture, are often unappealing and as such it may feel immoral to 
condone such punishments even for the most egregious moral actions. Although punishments 
like these may seem unacceptable, a closer look at the reasons for our revulsion reveal issues 
related to policy implementation and changing social constructs. Policy implementation and 
changing social constructs are certainly important considerations for policymakers who may 
wish to implement a system of punishment. However, political and social considerations are 
outside of the scope of philosophy and as such are irrelevant to the philosophical feasibility of 
retributive justice as a theory of punishment.  
By pointing to the unacceptable consequences of other moral theories, offering a solution 
to the most glaring objection to retributive justice, and giving justification for the certain 
punishments that proportional punishments require, I seek to prove that retributive justice alone 
remains a functional theory of justice. 
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Part 1: What is Punishment? 
1.1 Defining Punishment 
Before embarking on a defense and discussion of retributive justice, it is necessary to 
define exactly what it is I mean by “punishment”.  I intend to adhere to Feinberg’s definition of 
“punishment” as outlined in his work “The Expressive Function of Punishment” as the basis of 
my defense and discussion. I chose Feinberg’s definition of punishment due to his relatively 
critical but neutral stance on both retributivism and utilitarianism in order to start from an 
objective stance. 
Feinberg asserts the conventional definition of punishment “the infliction of hard 
treatment by an authority on a person for his prior failing in some respect” falls short of actually 
including the elements critical to punishment.1 Feinberg explains that the conventional definition 
of punishment is too broad and must be narrowed in order to identify a distinction between 
punishments and what he calls “penalties”.  
Feinberg defines “penalties” as “price-tags” in the form of hard treatment for behavior 
that is generally undesirable but still lacks the quality of being morally reprehensible. Some 
actions that are often subject to penalties include parking violations, failing grades, and 
disqualifications. Although penalties do possess the qualities of hard treatment for prior failing, 
Feinberg says they otherwise possess “miscellaneous character” and lack in moral value. 
According to Feinberg, we use the word “punishment” too loosely in our daily lives. For 
instance, when we say, “we punished the dog” we really mean that we penalized the dog. 
Animals are not moral agents and therefore cannot be punished as humans can. As a result no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Joel Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment”, in The Monist (Oxford, United 
Kingdon; Oxford University Press, 1965), 397 
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matter how harsh the hard treatment of animals may be, animals can only be subject to penalties, 
not punishments  
Quite distinct from penalties, Feinberg asserts that punishments have moral symbolic 
significance with a purpose of expressing resentment, indignation, and judgments of disapproval. 
Feinberg explains punishments require two distinct qualities penalties lack.2 The first quality 
requires that punishments possess both the hard treatment aspect of punishments and a 
reprobative symbolic function of condemnation for correcting a moral wrongdoing. Punishments 
must be given individual moral reasons for being administered in each case. If these moral 
reasons are not given then punishments completely fail to possess the moral elements that make 
it distinct from penalties. The second qualification requires that the reprobative symbolic 
function of a specific hard treatment actually provide justification for the punishment that is 
administered. The moral reason must in turn justify the type of punishment administered so that 
no immoral act is punished either too harshly or too leniently. These two qualifications are 
significant because when administering punishments we must give moral reasoning that explains 
the adequacy of the hard treatment in question.  
These qualifications requires moral justification for hard treatment and further shows that 
moral wrongdoing itself must give grounds for a specific type of punishment. The following 
example shows the two qualifications in application and further distinguishes punishments from 
penalties. Think of a situation where a man goes into a store and steals a pack of cigarettes and a 
case of beer. Instinctively we feel inclined to say that the man has committed some moral wrong 
and it is justifiable to punish him. This instinct is in-line with the first qualification. However, we 
would also feel the punishment is not justified for this crime if we chose to punish the criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Ibid.,	  400	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by subjecting him to death. The second qualification requires that the moral reasoning give 
grounds for the punishment in question. In this case, moral reasoning does not justify punishing 
the man by subjecting him to death. The second qualification aligns with our instinct and calls 
for a lighter punishment that is more suitable for the crime in question.  
Feinberg uses these two qualifications in order to determine four functions of punishment 
that presuppose a reprobative symbolic function of punishment. By straying away from a literal 
interpretation of lex talionis, I offer a feasible solution for these hard cases so that a system of 
proportional punishments can remain intact even in these cases.  
 
1.2 Functions of Punishment 
 Feinberg acknowledges that deterrence and reform are of great debate when it comes to 
functions of punishment.3 Feinberg does not seek to answer the complex question of whether 
punishment aids or hinders deterrence and reform. Instead, Feinberg simply states that there are 
four undeniable functions of punishment that are often overlooked but are in fact implied by the 
reprobative symbolic function. These four functions of punishment include Authoritative 
Disavowal, Symbolic Non-Acquiescence, Vindication of the Law, and Absolution of Others.  
 Authoritative Disavowal is an expression of disapproval from the state that thereby 
condemns a certain act. In order to illustrate Authoritative Disavowal as a function of 
punishment, Feinberg gives an example of a rogue fighter pilot whose national authorities punish 
him for an unauthorized attack against another nation. By punishing the rogue pilot, the nation 
condemns the attack and thereby disavows the act.4  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Ibid.,	  404	  4	  Ibid.,	  405	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 Symbolic Non-Acquiescence is the state’s refusal to condone certain actions. The need 
for Symbolic Non-Acquiescence arises when certain action is condoned by the state simply 
because a system does not exist for the action to be punished. Feinberg gives the example of the 
Texas paramour killings as an example of this. During the time of the paramour killings, 
murdering ones wife for committing adultery was considered morally justifiable. Because Texas 
did not have a system in place for punishing the husbands that killed their wives, the state in 
effect condoned these murders. Had the state implemented a system to punish the husbands who 
committed the paramour killings, Texas would have effectively shown that such acts were 
condemnable and expressed the state’s refusal to condone certain actions.5 
 Vindication of the Law is the idea that punishment only functions if the state makes the 
efforts to enforce the punishment it sets for certain unforgivable acts. In order to illustrate how 
this function could fail if vindication of the law is not enforced, Feinberg gives the example of 
killings of black men in Mississippi. By the 1960s, killing a black man was by law just as illegal 
killing of a white man. However, because juries rarely convicted murderers of black men by 
white men, this act was essentially condoned. This fourth qualification is distinct from Symbolic 
Non-Acquiescence because Vindication of the Law requires that the state has already 
acknowledged that a certain act is morally egregious and acts upon this acknowledgment to 
punish those who commit these acts. Symbolic Non-Acquiescence only requires that we have a 
system in place that punishes the morally egregious act, but does not require that we act in 
accordance with this system. Vindication of the Law requires that the state actually carry out the 
punishments for these morally egregious acts already recognized as such under Symbolic Non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Ibid.	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Acquiescence. If punishments are not vindicated as written, then the punishable act becomes 
condonable and the reprobative symbol of punishment fails to serve its purpose.6  
 Absolution of Others requires that punishment clear others of crimes they have not 
committed. When something scandalous occurs there are often several suspects. The act of 
punishing absolves other innocent suspects from suspicion. In this way, punishment of the actual 
criminal has the function of both restoring moral balance to society and restoring dignity to the 
innocent suspects. 
 These four functions of punishment implied by the reprobative symbolism of punishment 
must be fulfilled for a system to qualify as a legitimate theory of punishment. Assuming 
Feinberg’s definition of punishment holds true, some theories of punishment inevitably fail to 
meet this four function criteria and therefore fail to meet the standards required for punishment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ibid.,	  407	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Part II: Introduction to Theories of Punishment 
1.1 Utilitarianism  
Slightly different variations of utilitarianism exist throughout political philosophy. 
Furthermore utilitarianism is often applicable in a variety of other philosophical theories apart 
from punishment. However, these other applications of utilitarianism are beyond the scope of 
this work so I will not delve into these at this time. In order to clearly define which interpretation 
of utilitarianism I intend to refute in this work, I will use Feinberg’s summary of the utilitarian 
theory of punishment as defined in his work “The Classic Debate”.  
Feinberg summarizes the utilitarian theory of punishment with the following three 
propositions:7  
1. Social utility (correction, prevention, deterrence, etc.) is a necessary condition for 
justified punishment. Social utility can roughly be defined as the act that creates the most 
aggregate benefit even at the expense of a few.   
2. Social utility is a sufficient condition for justified punishment.  
3. The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the offender is that amount which 
will do the most good or the least harm to all those who will be affected by it.  
 
1.2 Retributivism 
Slightly different variations of retributivism also exist throughout political philosophy. 
All variations of retributivism most generally adhere to the principle of lex talionis, “eye for an 
eye, tooth for a tooth”. Lax talionis says that one should be punished exactly to the extent that 
one harmed the victim. In order to clearly define what I mean by retributivism, I shall again use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Joel Feinberg, “The Classic Debate”, in Philosophy of Law (Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 
2004), 627.	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Feinberg’s summary of retributivism as defined in his work “The Classic Debate”. Feinberg 
summarizes the most popular variant of retributivism, called pure moralistic retributivism, in this 
work. Feinberg summarizes pure moralistic retributivism as follows:8  
1. Moral guilt is a necessary condition for justified punishment.  
2. Moral guilt is a sufficient condition (“irrespective of consequences”) for justified 
punishment. 
3. The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally guilty offender is the 
amount, which fits, matches, or is proportionate to the moral gravity of the offense.  
For the purposes of this work, I will assume that both negative and positive views of 
retributivism hold equal weight. The positive retributivist holds that wrongdoers deserve to be 
punished for their wrongful acts. According to the positive retributivist, the state has a duty to 
impose punishments on those who have committed wrongful acts. Immanuel Kant, the most 
widely known retributivist, endorses this view in The Metaphysics of Morals when he claims, 
“whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, that you inflict upon 
yourself”.9 Positive retributivism provides explanations as to what and why criminals deserve to 
suffer 10 and why it is the state’s role to inflict the suffering.11 The negative retributivist holds 
that wrongdoers forfeit their right not to be punished. From this, the negative retributivist reaches 
another principle of retributivism, which states, “one who is guilty may be punished”, but this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 625. 
9 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 6:332. 
10 Lawrence H. Davis, “They Deserve to Suffer” in Analysis (Oxford, United Kingdom, 1972), 
136. 
11 Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited (London, United 
Kingdom: Pluto Publishing, 2006), ch. 2. 	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does not necessarily guarantee that the wrongdoer must be punished.12 Together, these two views 
tell us that those who have done no wrong cannot be punished and furthermore wrongdoers 
cannot be punished beyond the extent of the moral gravity of their actions.  
The retributivist believes that correcting for moral wrongdoing is necessary in order to offset 
the moral imbalance caused by the crime. Punishment serves as a way to effectively offset the 
immoral nature of crimes. In order to be effective, punishments must follow the principle of lax 
talionis and be proportional to the immoral act it is striving to offset.  
Although not without objections, retributivism succeeds in fulfilling the four functions of 
punishment. Thesis 3 requires that retributivism fulfill the first qualification by guaranteeing 
hard punishment be inflicted on the perpetrators of an immorally wrong act. Thesis 1 and Thesis 
2 guarantee the second qualification of punishment by necessitating that only the morally guilty 
are punished, providing a justification for the punishments. By satisfying these two qualifications 
of punishment, retributivism also succeeds in fulfilling the four functions of punishment.   
This fulfillment of the four functions of punishment is significant because it shows 
retributivism provides concrete grounds for differentiating between penalties and punishments. A 
system with purely penalties is not feasible for achieving the justice that every theory of 
punishment strives to achieve because it lacks the moral qualification implied by the term justice 
itself. Justice implies that some sort fair treatment in response to some immoral action has been 
performed. With only penalties, such a moral response is not even feasible because penalties 
completely lack the quality of moral condemnation or response. A moral response required by 
justice can only be accomplished through punishments. Retributivism makes room for both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  J.L. Mackie, “Morality and the Retributive Emotions” in Criminal Justice Ethics, 3-10	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penalties and punishments and in effect successfully fulfills the moral qualifications required by 
justice.   
  
1.3 Dualist Theories  
 Despite strong immediate appeal, certain aspects of both retributivism and utilitarianism 
remain problematic. The appeal and problematic nature of both theories becomes even more 
apparent when the two theories are evaluated side by side as done above. In an effort to combat 
these problems while retaining the more positive aspects of both theories, dualist theories 
emerged. In the sections that follow I intend to prove that despite the efforts of dualists to 
reconcile both theories, dualist theories remain challenging and the problems remaining in 
dualism actually lend support for retributivism as the only viable method of punishment. Below I 
have provided explanations for the three major types of dualistic theories as a basis for my 
refutation to come later.  
  
Split-Level Dualism  
 Split-level dualists believe that stages of forming and determining punishment are split 
into two distinct phases. The first phase consists of justifying the institution of punishment 
through utilitarian considerations. The second phase consists of determining the quality and 
quantity of punishments, which must be justified through retributive considerations. The actual 
determination of “particular action” within these practices should be given retributive 
considerations. The security guard’s dilemma explained below can be used to illustrate the 
reasoning required in split-level dualism.   
 Suppose a man steals $100,000 from a bank.  Suppose further that the money comes from 
12 
a safety box that no one has opened in twenty years. The owner of the safety box has since 
passed away with no known heirs. No one in the bank knows of the crime. The only person that 
knows of the crime is a lone security guard who catches the thief in the act. The thief offers to 
pay the security guard $25,000 in exchange for his silence. Furthermore, the security guard is 
currently struggling to care for his four children and aging mother. The security guard is 
conflicted but must ultimately make a decision.  
 According to split-dualism, the security guard should first consider whether punishing the 
thief would be justified under utilitarian considerations. In the security guard’s dilemma, the net 
pleasure from letting the thief go would result in a net increase in total happiness. Since no one 
else would know about the robbery and no one is entitled to the money in the box, the robbery 
would increase pleasure for both the security guard and thief.  No one would suffer from the 
robbery since without the thief’s interference the money would have been left untouched and of 
no use to anyone. The second phase becomes void in light of the consideration made in the first 
phase. There is no need for punishment in this case because utilitarian considerations of the 
scenario determine that punishment for the thief is unnecessary. In fact, punishing the thief 
would actually result in net loss of happiness due to the pain the thief will experience from the 
punishment.  
 Suppose the above dilemma were altered so that the cash box containing $100,000 
belonged to a prominent family who would reward the security guard the entire cash value for 
turning in the thief. Suppose still, this $100,000 cash reward would bring the security guard’s 
family so much happiness that it would outweigh the suffering felt by the punished thief. In this 
case, the security guard should elect to turn in the thief. The second phase would then come into 
consideration in order to determine the punishment proportionate to the thief’s crime.  
13 
 As the security guard’s dilemma illustrates, split-level dualism incorporates both 
utilitarianism and retributivism respectively in order to determine first whether punishments 
should be administered and then to what degree a particular form of punishment is acceptable.  
 
Integrated Dualist Theory  
 According to the integrated dualist, retribution is central to punishment. Some moral 
wrongdoing is required for administration of punishment and this punishment must be in some 
way proportional to the wrongdoing. Although retributivism is necessary for punishment, it is 
not sufficient. The integrated dualist claims it is overly idealistic to assume that retribution can 
be the sole justification for punishment. There must be some other role played by the 
punishment, namely deterrence. Only utilitarianism can give punishment this role and satisfy the 
requirement.13 
 Integrated dualism reverses the use of utilitarianism and retributivism in the two phases 
of consideration. The differences that result from the reversal of reasoning for the two phases are 
best illustrated by using the security guard’s dilemma illustrated above for split-level dualism. 
Integrated dualism would require the security guard in the first phase to consider whether the 
thief’s actions morally justify punishment.  The above scenario justifies some form of 
punishment for the thief in phase one. The considerations in the first phase negates the security 
guard’s ability to take the cash bribe because then he himself would be committing an act worthy 
of punishment under phase one. In phase two, the security guard must consider what the 
appropriate punishment for the crime is through utilitarian calculations. If under the utilitarian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 David Wood, “Crime Reduction and Justification of Punishment” in Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies (Oxford, United Kingdom, 2002), 307. 
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calculation it would bring the most pleasure not to punish the thief, then not punishing the thief 
becomes the optimal choice.  
 Integrated dualists make a moral wrongdoing a necessary condition for punishment but 
require utilitarian considerations in order to justify the actual punishment itself.   
 
Mere Conjunction Dualism 
 Mere conjunction dualists attempt to change split-level dualism and integrated dualism 
theories in an effort to create a functional system of dualism that emphasizes retributivism and 
utilitarianism equally. Lacey does not believe that these other two conceptions of dualism are 
necessarily flawed, but simply incomplete. Lacey reconciles the two versions of dualism by 
introducing “two principal political values”, autonomy and welfare. Lacy explains that mere 
conjunction approach to dualism is a pluralistic approach that integrates justification for 
punishment and determines the nature of the actual punishments themselves in conjunction.14 
Instead of valuing the utilitarian considerations and retributivist considerations in a certain order, 
the mere conjunctive dualist uses good judgment in order to weigh each consequence. Lacey 
says this conjunctive approach allows us to avoid the issue of utilitarianism considerations 
overriding retributivist considerations and vice versa. Lacey does not believe dualism necessarily 
requires a step-by-step procedure. Rather, Lacey says that both utilitarian and retributivist 
considerations should be made together in determining the reasoning for punishment and 
assigning the method of punishment.  
 Using the security guard dilemma, the mere conjunction dualist would take into 
consideration both the utilitarian consequences of accepting the bribe and the moral wrongness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Nicola Lacey, State Punishment (London, United Kingdom: International Library of 
Philosophy, 1988), 59. 
15 
of the thief’s actions at the same time. After weighing these consequences together using his own 
good judgment, the security guard would use mere conjunction dualism to make what he feels is 
the right decision.  
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Part III: Failures and Objections 
1.1 Failure of Utilitarianism 
Although the three utilitarian propositions may seem relatively appealing upon first 
glance, further consideration makes it apparent that they are not sufficient to guarantee the four 
functions of punishment. These four functions of punishment must be satisfied in order to 
function as a theory of punishment. Unless utilitarianism can fulfill these four functions, it 
simply dissolves into a theory of penalties or undeserved hard treatments. As mentioned 
previously, justice possesses some sort of moral implications that must be fulfilled in any theory 
of punishment. A theory of strictly penalties without any punishment cannot function as a 
feasible theory of punishment because penalties fail to pose any moral weight in its hard 
treatments. Penalties are simply used in order to create a well-functioning society that indeed 
provides many benefits to those within it but lack the moral requirements for justice.  
 Perhaps the utilitarian accepts my objection as true and agrees that the hard punishments 
implied by the utilitarian theory adheres to neither Feinberg’s definition of punishment outlined 
above nor to the four functions of punishment. Suppose the utilitarian also accepts that hard 
treatments backed by some moral reasoning is required for a theory of punishment. Still, the 
utilitarian can say that the hard treatments administered under the utilitarian theory can more 
adequately be called “bunishments”, in which punishments do not necessarily have to adhere to 
the two qualifications or four functions of punishments. The utilitarian can go further and say 
“bunishments” do fulfill the requirements for morality but simply in a different way from 
punishments. “Bunishments” do not consider the traditional elements of morality considered in 
punishments. Instead, “bunishments” focus on producing the highest amount of benefit and in 
effect creating a maximally morally good state. For the utilitarian, a maximally morally good 
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state would be that which the aggregate benefit is the highest. In this way, “bunishments” fulfill 
the qualities of moral implications coupled with hard treatment that are required for a theory of 
punishment. 
“Bunishments” seem to save utilitarianism from falling prey to a theory of penalties that 
does not satisfy the requirements of justice. However, even with “bunishments” the utilitarian 
cannot escape the fact that certain egregious moral acts, such as murder, could go unpunished. 
The possibility of condoning such extreme crimes under “bunishment” goes against basic ideas 
of justice and morality, making it difficult for utilitarianism to remain plausible. The morally 
contradictory implications of bunishments still remains problematic for the utilitarian and must 
be resolved before utilitarianism can be considered a feasible theory of punishment. The morally 
uncomfortable implications of bunishments can best be illustrated with the following example.  
Suppose a man, Murderer, breaks into a home and brutally murders two young girls and 
their parents. Murderer does a remarkable job cleaning up so that no evidence of the crime 
remains in the house. Furthermore, Murderer expertly plants evidence around the house so that it 
looks as though the family simply moved away. This evidence leads friends and neighbors to 
believe that the family did indeed flee in the middle of the night. Furthermore, let us suppose that 
both parents were orphans and have no other family. The only record of the crime is a single 
recording with no other copies that is sent to the prosecutor’s personal secure email by Murderer 
himself. Prosecutor opens the video file and witnesses the murder. Let us assume Prosecutor has 
the distinct ability to read people’s thoughts and can discern from the video that Murderer will 
never commit another act like this again. Because the prosecutor knows that Murderer will never 
commit another crime like this and no loved ones or witnesses remain who could potentially 
become suspicious, Prosecutor must decide not to press charges against Murderer on utilitarian 
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grounds. Pressing charges would result in only increased suffering and no benefit for it will 
instill grief and fear in the neighbors and result in suffering in the form of punishment for 
Murderer. Even though pressing charges may increase aggregate suffering, something seems 
wrong about not pressing charges against and punishing Murderer. Our moral intuition tells us 
that Murderer must be held accountable in some way for his actions even though it may increase 
overall suffering. 
The inadequate moral consideration that takes place before administering hard treatment 
through utilitarianism is definitely the utilitarian’s biggest downfall. However, the three theses 
for utilitarianism cannot help but seem compelling when placed in succession as above. Closer 
inspection of the three theses, however, reveals additional unavoidable objections that must be 
resolved before the utilitarian theory can be validated.  
 Thesis 1 of utilitarianism states, “Social utility (correction, prevention, deterrence, etc) is 
a necessary condition for justified punishment.” Thesis 1, though different from Thesis 1 of 
retributivists, also appeals to common sense intuitions of morality.15 For instance, if it were 
possible to reform criminals effectively without punishment then it certainly seems reasonable to 
use this method of deterrence instead.  
 Thesis 2 states, “Social utility is a sufficient condition for justified punishment”. Thesis 2 
proves more troubling for the utilitarian.16 If we were to follow the reasoning outlined in Thesis 
2, it seems completely reasonable to punish the innocent in order to maximize social utility. Such 
punishments upon the innocent are abominations of morality and go completely against our 
common sense intuitions of justice. H. L. A. Hart defends this weakness in utilitarianism by 
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saying such an interpretation is an abuse of the definition of punishment. Hart calls this common 
abuse by the retributivist a “definitional stop”.17 According to Hart, guilt is implied in the very 
definition of punishment. Saying society condones “punishing the innocent” is just as 
problematic as saying “I allow you to fix something that is not broken”. Hart says the definition 
of punishment implies hard treatment is inflicted only on those who are guilty and does not in 
any way condone punishment of the innocent. In this defense Hart appeals to certain 
preconceived notions of punishment and fairness that do not necessarily have to hold true. The 
following scenario illustrates this fact.  
 Suppose a young child, Catherine, possesses the yearning and propensity for learning. 
Unfortunately for Catherine she has no access to school or a public library. Luckily, Catherine’s 
father possesses a large collection of books and a computer with Internet. In order to satisfy her 
urge to learn, Catherine spends much of her time reading and watching lectures online. However, 
whenever Catherine’s father catches Catherine learning he locks her in a small closet with no 
food or water for hours at a time. In such a case, it would be difficult to claim Catherine is not 
punished even though, as Hart would say, “nothing is broken”.  
The utilitarian may defend himself by reasoning that Catherine’s father’s judgment is 
simply flawed and he is indeed correcting a perceived wrong, however wrong his perception may 
be. Catherine’s father wrongly believes it is harmful for his daughter to have such a strong desire 
for learning. However, let us suppose that Catherine’s father does not think this way. Suppose 
Catherine’s father believes it is completely acceptable for his daughter to have an inclination for 
learning and actually wishes to encourage such actions. Still, due to some unfortunate 
unexplainable circumstances of his psychology he feels justified in his harsh treatment whenever 	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he sees Catherine actively learning. Even in such a modified scenario, it remains difficult for the 
utilitarian to deny that Catherine is experiencing some form of punishment. In fact, defining 
Catherine’s treatment as something other than punishment, however undeserved, seems difficult. 
This scenario proves that Hart’s definitional appeal to the word “punishment” does not to 
provide an adequate defense for the objection to Thesis 2. As Catherine’s father’s treatment 
shows, although it may go against certain notions of fairness all forms of punishment do not 
result from moral wrongdoings  
Thesis 3 states, “The proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the offender is 
that amount which will do the most good or the least harm to all those who will be affected by 
it.” Thesis 3 proves even more problematic for the utilitarian. Thesis 3 goes against many 
common sense intuitions about punishment and proportionality. For instance, it seems radically 
unfair to punish a murderer with the payment of a mere two-dollar fine or imprison someone for 
life for a mere parking violation. However under utilitarian considerations such discrepancies 
between crime and treatment seem appropriate, such as in the case with Murderer above. 
Bentham attempts to answer this objection by stating that proper application of the utilitarian 
method would make such gross disproportionality impossible. According to Bentham, 
consequences resulting from acts of “mischief” have two dimensions. Bentham defines acts of 
mischief as any immoral act, such as rape, murder, robbery, etc. The first dimension of mischief, 
“the original”, is the pain suffered by the victim of the mischief itself. The second dimension of 
mischief Bentham names “the derivative” is the secondary effects felt by those who learn of the 
mischief. Bentham says the derivative effects of mischief result in “alarm and danger”. The 
alarm stems from those who are secondarily affected by the act. The danger stems from those 
who may not be directly effected by this particular act of mischief but who hear of the act and 
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feel a sense of danger at the prospect of becoming the victim of such mischief. Due to such 
unavoidable cases Bentham believes utilitarianism requires a system of punishment, which 
would put an end or at least seriously deter, mischief. Bentham believes that the punishment of a 
few offenders would likely curb the other would-be offenders from committing any future 
morally reprehensible acts. Furthermore, Bentham says if punishments for mischief fail to match 
the magnitude of the immoral actions to some degree, the temptation to commit acts of mischief 
would rise. This temptation would result in not only increases of original consequences but also 
increases in the derivative consequences. Derivative consequences would increase both due to 
the alarm experienced by those close to the victim and the elevated danger felt by potential 
victims who became aware that the proper measures for deterrence of such crimes did not exist.  
Although Bentham’s defense may seem to solve this objection to Thesis 3, further 
considerations make a gross injustice of proportionality still seems plausible under utilitarianism. 
Once again consider the case of Murderer outlined above. The two young girls and couple who 
were killed encompass the “original” dimension of suffering. This original dimension of 
suffering has already been experienced and no actions taken can minimize the magnitude of 
suffering felt by the murdered family. Therefore, the suffering felt by the family can be 
understood to be a kind of sunk cost in terms of suffering that cannot be undone. No actions from 
this point forward can undo the suffering felt by the victims of murder. Murderer’s case seems to 
completely lack the derivative effects of “mischief” since no neighbors know what actually 
happened to the family and no family members who might become suspicious remain. The only 
other person who knows of the act, Prosecutor, does not feel as though he is doing anything 
immoral since he is simply applying the utilitarian standards for administering hard treatment. 
Furthermore, since Prosecutor knows that Murderer will not commit such egregious acts again, 
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utilitarian calculations require the Prosecutor refrain from punishing Murderer in any way. No 
deterrence of mischief can occur from punishing because no one knows of the moral offense and 
it is known for certain that Murderer will never commit such an offense again. Therefore, any act 
of punishment will only result in a decrease of aggregate benefit, contrary to the results that 
Bentham predicted would occur in every such case. 
 The Murderer case poses a serious problem for the utilitarian. The utilitarian could 
conceivably accept that certainly cases of unsolved and unpunished criminals exist, but still 
argue that the millions of dollars spent solving the cases could be better spent elsewhere. This 
result seems problematic because such leniency would increase the incentives for immoral acts 
for those who have the capacity to commit difficult-to-detect crimes or have the resources to 
acquire sophisticated attorneys who would make the investigation expensive. Such would imply 
that the capable and wealthy alone are justified in their immoral actions to others. Such a defense 
also goes against Bentham’s defense of punishments, minimizing both the original and the 
derivative consequences of mischief. A policy that promotes difficult to detect and expensive 
crimes would promote greater consequences from mischief since many of these crimes could be 
performed on a wider or more harmful scale. Furthermore, this defense still does not justify 
failing to punish Murderer when the expenses for obtaining evidence and admittance of guilt are 
fairly low. In such a case, it seems both economically efficient and morally correct to administer 
punishment fitting of Murderer’s crime. Unless utilitarianism can adequately provide an 
explanation for the objection to Thesis 3 illustrated through the Murderer case, it loses validity as 
an adequate theory of punishment.  
 Even if all of the theses held true, utilitarianism still fails to uphold the two qualifications 
and four functions of punishment. The first qualification requires that punishment include a hard 
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treatment coupled with a reprobative symbol of wrongdoing. Utilitarianism fails to meet this 
condition because it does not require hard treatments or reprobative symbol of wrongdoing of 
any kind if it does not provide increased social utility. Even in cases where punishments are 
administered, the utilitarian would condone punishments without reprobative symbol of 
wrongdoing, such as in the case with Catherine and her father. The second qualification that the 
reprobative symbol justifies the hard treatment cannot be satisfied without the fulfillment of the 
first qualification. It might be plausible to claim that social utility, rather than the reprobative 
symbol behind the hard treatment provides the justification for the punishment, but the utilitarian 
failure to defend social utility as the only required condition for punishment in Thesis 3 makes 
this claim difficult to defend. As a result of the utilitarian failure to adhere to these two 
qualifications, utilitarianism fails to meet the four functions of punishment implied by the very 
definition of punishment.  
 The utilitarian runs into the unresolvable problem of justifying punishing the innocent 
while allowing the guilty to walk free in many situations because of its faulty conception of 
good.  The utilitarian defines “good” act as anything that maximizes some concept of utility, 
most commonly pleasure or happiness, while minimizing suffering. This concept of the good, 
although appealing at first, fails to encompass what is actually good. The following case proves 
that maximization of utility fails to encompass the multidimensional characteristic of the “good”. 
Suppose there exists a society where murderers are only punished mildly for their crimes. 
These mild punishments result in very little suffering for the murderers of this particular society. 
Even though the suffering is mild, the punishment inflicted completely eliminates the desire to 
kill so that the murderers pose no further threat of suffering for others.  Such is not necessarily a 
good world even though it certainly will provide the highest level of utility. In such cases we 
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cannot help but get the sense that even though it does not strictly maximize utility, adequately 
punishing the murderer is “good” in some other sense and not punishing the murderer seems 
wrong in some way. Even if we could completely eliminate every murderer’s inclination for 
killing, it seems problematic not to punish him and even seems contrary to commonly accepted 
beliefs about personal autonomy and individual choices. Simply eliminating the desires for 
killing implies that the performance of morally egregious actions is akin to suffering from a 
disease that can easily be cured.  
This cavalier attitude towards choosing to commit murder completely disregards the 
inherent value of “good” apart from utility, such as personal autonomy and choice. Such flippant 
disregard for personal autonomy discounts the “good” that comes form human ability to make 
individual choices. Despite the moral wrongness of certain actions such as murder, most would 
agree there exists some “good” in human ability to exercise personal autonomy and such abilities 
should be encouraged overall. The inherent goodness of individual choices requires some sort of 
reaction to the results of these choices. Even if the reaction is in the form of punishment and does 
not maximize utility, it provides grounds for the inherent “good” in personal autonomy. The 
“good” in valuing personal autonomy and independent choices is a “good” that cannot be 
captured adequately by only striving to maximize total utility.  
In this particular case, simply increasing utility by subjecting the murderer to only a little 
suffering would indeed maximize the utilitarian perception of “good”. Eliminating the ability to 
decide to murder and inflicting only a small punishment shows disregard for the “good” of 
personal autonomy. In this way, just deserts for morally egregious actions serves as a way to 
uphold the “good” in the ability to make individual choices while still condemning the 
wrongness of the killing.  
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 Punishment through utilitarian ideals fails to serve the functions of punishment. This is 
problematic because utilitarianism does not appear capable of defending itself against its failure 
to adhere to the requirements of punishment even through some renewed classification of hard 
treatment. Furthermore, Thesis 2 and Thesis 3 completely go against intuitions of justice upon 
further analysis. Finally, the utilitarian concept of “good” proves problematic because it 
completely disregards the importance of other dimensions of “good” apart from utility. The 
failure of utilitarianism necessitates the existence of some better system of punishment that 
aligns with both the definition of punishment and our instinctual conceptions of justice.  
 
1.2 Objections to Retributivism  
Even though retributivism meets the qualifications and functions of a feasible justice 
system, objections still remain as to the validity of this theory. The first thesis certainly appeals 
to common sense intuitions of morality and fairness of punishment. It certainly seems rational to 
require moral guilt provide justification for the punishment administered. The other two theses 
are less apparent and thus remain problematic for the retributivist. However, further examination 
of these objections proves such objections are either misinterpretations of the thesis itself or 
objections that prove equally problematic for the utilitarian.  
  Thesis 2, which states that moral guilt is a sufficient condition for punishment, appears 
slightly problematic for the retributivist upon first glance because it allows for infliction of 
suffering on a guilty person even when no good comes of it. However, those who make this 
objection fail to grasp the retributivist conception of “good”. The utilitarian believes 
maximization of happiness or pleasure and minimization of suffering defines what is “good”. 
This forces the utilitarian to draw some uncomfortable conclusions regarding how we should act 
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in certain cases, such as in the punishment of an innocent person. The retributivist avoids this 
problem by defining “good” as a kind of absolute adherence to morally right actions.18 Unlike 
the utilitarian, the retributivist is not concerned with maximizing something as simple as 
“happiness” or “pleasure”. As appealing as these simplifications may be, happiness and pleasure 
fail to fully encompass what most people think when they think of a “good” life. In fact, people 
often advocate foregoing happiness and pleasure in order to ensure basic moral rights remain 
respected. The retributivist perception of the “good” requires that punishment must be 
administered even when utility is not maximized in order to align with moral rightness. The case 
below illustrates the reasonableness of administering punishments even when net pleasure and 
happiness may decrease as a result. 
Imagine a case where a grown man constantly inflicts physical discomfort and pain onto 
a small child. Let us further suppose that even though the baby is currently experiencing pain, by 
the time he is old enough to form long-term memories of the abuse, the abuser will cease 
inflicting pain and the baby will suffer no adverse future physical or psychological 
consequences. The level of pleasure the man experiences from inflicting pain far exceed the level 
of pain felt by the baby. In this case, happiness and pleasure may see a net increase. Even though 
the baby experiences the suffering now, he will not remember it in a few years time while the joy 
felt by the abuser will endure far beyond a few years. Still, we feel inclined to say that the abuser 
is acting unjustly. We do not believe that maximizing pleasure justifies inflicting physical harm 
on the infant. We can rationally explain the injustice of the man’s actions by appealing to the 
idea that the infant’s basic moral rights to his body were violated exclusively for the pleasures of 
the abuser. Furthermore, we cannot help but reason that the man must be punished in some way 
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for his actions. Restoring and respecting the infant’s basic moral rights calls for punishing the 
man even if no additional utility may come from the punishment. Moral goodness requires 
foregoing the man’s pleasure to preserve the infant’s moral rights even at the expense of utility. 
Failure to forego certain pleasures in certain cases in effect disregards the moral rights of others. 
Because we feel inclined to respect everyone’s moral rights to some extent, condoning physical 
discomfort and pain for the sake of maximizing utility or failing to punish the man because it 
may decrease overall utility feels instinctively wrong.  
Just as the above case illustrates, happiness and pleasure instinctually lose their positive 
value when maximizing happiness result in unjust consequences. By defining the “good” as a 
kind of adherence to moral rights, the retributivist escapes this utilitarian problem. The 
retributivist view of the “good” allows for cases where morality calls for taking actions that may 
not necessarily maximize pleasure. The retributivist view of the good also allows us to conclude 
that actions that have adverse consequences for utility can still have positive value if its purpose 
is to preserve moral rights. In order to correct for certain imbalances of morality and basic rights 
as in the above case, punishments become necessary to restore moral balance even if it decreases 
net happiness. 
Here, many the utilitarian may object that the instinct to adhere to moral rights and 
restore morality comes from nothing more than human desire for vengeance. The view that 
retributivism ideas stem from vengeance misunderstands the core principle of retributivism. 
Retributivism necessitates punishment for morally egregious actions not out of vengeance but 
rather as a desire to restore negative moral imbalances and respect basic moral rights for all 
parties involved. Punishment is simply an effective instrument used to restore this moral balance, 
much like teachers use grades as an instrument to evaluate academic performance. When 
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teachers assign low grades to students, it is rarely the result of some lust for vengeance. Rather, 
grades assignments are determined “with eyes firmly fixed on past performance”.19 Even when 
feelings of vengeance arise, it is nothing more than an unfortunate byproduct of society’s attempt 
to restore moral balance. It would be incorrect to conclude that vengeance is a primary motivator 
for punishment simply because it exists in certain instances where punishment is necessary. 
Although not an intended consequence of retributivism, it is also worth acknowledging that by 
guaranteeing that appropriate punishments will be administered to restore moral rights could 
actually work to combat vengeance by preventing victims from taking actions in their own 
hands.  
 Even when certain individual forms of punishments for morally offensive actions do not 
necessarily seem beneficial from the outset, societal betterment results from the restoring of 
moral balance from an otherwise immoral position. The consistent application of punishment is 
critical in order to ensure that the balance of morality remains. Allowing for exceptions will 
inevitably result in moral balance being shifted towards the morally unacceptable. Exceptions 
also create room for uncertainty about the moral detriment of certain actions. Furthermore, the 
consistent application of punishment provides objective standards for determining the degree of 
moral reprehensibility of the punishable actions. It also provides guidelines for determining 
exactly what actions must be taken to restore moral balance. These objective standards reassure 
those who live within the system that violations of moral rights will indeed be adequately 
restored. 
In this way, retributivism provides grounds for a more justifiable theory of punishment 
than utilitarianism. Retributivism reassures citizens that any morally wrong action will be 	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restored and punishments will not be inflicted for any other reason. As long as citizens live 
without violating the rights of others, they exist comfortably with the knowledge that no 
punishments will befall them. Contrary to this, utilitarianism creates an underlying fear where 
each citizen worries whether he must sacrifice his own well being for the betterment of others. 
Although this is an unintended byproduct of the retributivists, whose chief aim is to ensure that 
moral balance is restored, the benefits from consistent application of retributivist principles 
secures its benefits over utilitarian even in this regard. Thesis 2 ensures that punishments will 
consistently be administered in order to restore moral balance and result in an overall betterment 
of society. 
The utilitarian could say that utilitarianism remains justifiable and could actually provide 
more aggregate benefit for those living within its system if only those who were responsible for 
doling out the hard treatments were the ones who knew the reason for the application of hard 
treatments. In this application of utilitarianism, all other citizens, except those directly on a need-
to-know basis, would be oblivious to all disproportionately lenient or grossly over exaggerated 
hard treatments. Although this revision may solve some of the utilitarian’s problems, the very 
fact that the utilitarianism requires concealing the reasons for the benefits of hard treatment in 
certain cases cannot not help but feel instinctively immoral and unjust.  
Thesis 3 states that the proper amount of punishment to be inflicted upon the morally guilty 
offender is the amount, which is proportionate to the moral gravity of the offense. Thesis 3 
proves to raise the most difficult questions for the retributivist and is in need of the most 
thorough defense.20 First, it seems impossible to punish an offender without causing harm to 
loved ones or dependents. Second, the aim of proportioning punishment to gravity of offense 
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would require punishing trivial offenses, like rudeness, rather harshly and in some cases require 
these trivial offenses to be punished more than more serious offenses. Third, there is the problem 
of determining the correct type and amount of punishment for offenses. Solving this problem 
would require an individual assessment of each offender’s character and thorough understanding 
of the magnitude of the moral wrong committed. The assessment would require determining the 
degree of suffering that would be felt by an offender for each form of punishment in order to 
determine which would be most applicable given the specific circumstances. Application of pure 
retributivist theory would therefore require abandonment of fixed punishments with fixed crimes 
and substitution of individual punishments based on character evaluations that seem to go against 
our common sense intuitions of proportional punishment.  
The first two questions raised by Thesis 3 are relatively easy to refute. The first consequence 
of harming loved ones and dependents are indeed unfortunate byproduct of restoring moral 
balance but simply unavoidable if the reprobative symbolism of punishment is to be realized and 
the four functions fulfilled. Here, it seems necessary to delineate the difference between general 
suffering and suffering through punishment. General suffering results from no particular immoral 
act but rather a byproduct of ones surroundings or natural composition. Instances of general 
suffering include mental illnesses, physical ailments, and the consequences of having to watch a 
loved one suffer. All of these circumstances, though certainly unfortunate, do not result from the 
infliction of an immoral act onto the sufferer. Therefore, general suffering cannot be taken into 
consideration when determining the morality of certain actions. Conversely, suffering through 
punishment results when the sufferer has committed an immoral act and therefore has given up 
his right not be punished. In these cases, suffering is necessary in order to restore moral balance 
and fulfill the functions of punishment. The suffering felt by those who care for the receiver of 
31 
punishment is another case of general suffering that does not hold moral weight but is simply an 
unfortunate byproduct of balancing morality.  
The second question raised by Thesis 3 can be completely dismissed by the fact that trivial 
offenses, like rudeness, would not be subject to punishments but rather penalties under the 
retributivist theory. Rudeness, although undesirable, does not hold the moral gravity of other 
more serious crimes that would actually offset a moral balance in society. Because of this, hard 
treatments for rudeness are simply the result of administering penalties in order to maintain 
societal order and lack the moral reprobative function required for punishment. 
The third question raised by Thesis 3 is much more difficult to refute. As such, the third 
question requires a much more lengthy defense that I will seek to provide in the sections 
following the failure of dualist theories.   
 
1.3 Failure of Dualism 
Split-Level Dualism  
 By requiring that the first phase of punishment be determined by utilitarian calculations, 
split-level dualism fails as an adequate alternative theory of punishment because it faces the 
same problems as Thesis 2 of utilitarianism. Under this two-step approach, it does not seem 
implausible to imagine a system where rules or practices are set in a way that punishing of the 
innocent is indeed permissible if it were to benefit the rest of society. Split-level dualism also 
justifies, and actually seems to require, that more crimes be committed if it nets greater 
happiness. For instance, in the security guard’s dilemma, split-level dualism justifies the security 
guard taking the bribe from the thief if it will net to greater happiness. Both of these possible 
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conclusions cannot help but result in absurd moral judgments that completely go against our 
intuitions of justice.    
Furthermore, the second layer of the split-level dualism may prevent those who adhere to 
this theory of punishment from allowing Murderer, in the above case, to completely get away 
with murdering the family. However, the first-step requiring utilitarian considerations trump 
retributive considerations, will almost make certain that Murderer will not be subject to the 
proportional punishments that align with his actions. Using the split-level dualist’s logic, we 
would have to conclude in the first step that punishing Murderer will not bring a net increase in 
happiness for society as a whole since no one has knowledge of the acts or any personal 
connections to Murderer’s victims. Such a result completely goes against our intuitions of proper 
punishments for murder and does not bring about an acceptable result compatible with our 
conceptions of justice.  
 
Integrated Dualism 
Integrated dualism remains problematic as a theory of punishment because it seems to 
justify over punishing for small crimes. For instance, if utilitarian considerations for deterrence 
were so heavily weighted a system could be put in place so that the punishment for bicycle theft 
is death. Such a system would indeed successfully deter future bike thieves but the gross 
disproportionality of the punishment to the wrongdoing would make such punishments 
unacceptable. As the case illustrates, it does not seem that utilitarian function of deterrence is 
necessary for punishment. Even if the bike thief were to steal another bicycle again, common 
sense intuitions tell us that killing the bike thief for a relatively small crime is unjust and 
unnecessarily disproportionate to the crime committed. However, adhering to utilitarian 
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calculations would make such a punishment conceivable and quite possibly even necessary in 
order to ensure deterrence.21 
Even if the integrated dualist were to concede that using this particular two-step method 
could result in gross disproportionality, he could still reason that such an act is still acceptable 
because the value from the future deterrence would outweigh the consequences from severely 
punishing one criminal. However, the utilitarian justification for punishment would also allow 
for criminals to walk away unpunished even for some of the most heinous crimes.  
Suppose I were to track down a Nazi war criminal in Argentina who has not yet been 
punished for his crimes. Because of his vast worldwide connections and power in Nazi Germany, 
he has been able to escape prosecution all these years. Suppose still, he does not feel any remorse 
about his participation in acts like the Holocaust and feels the movement was justified. However, 
because of his old age and years of anonymity, he can no longer do any harm nor does he intend 
to. The first step of integrated dualism would require we make retributivist calculations to 
determine whether the Nazi war criminal deserves punishment. Given he was an active 
participant in the Holocaust and still does not feel remorse, it certainly seems justified to punish 
the Nazi war criminal under retributivist justifications. The second step requires giving utilitarian 
consideration for the actual hard treatment that should be administered as punishment for these 
crimes. Utilitarian considerations seem to suggest we are not justified in administering any form 
punishment since doing so would only decrease the Nazi war criminal’s utility. Administering 
punishment would fail to increase utility for other groups since the criminal lives a life of 
anonymity and is no longer in a position to harm others. However, allowing the Nazi to go 
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Studies (Oxford, United Kingdom, 2002), 309. 	  
34 
unpunished strikes most as unjust and rather unfair especially in light of the heinous crimes he 
committed.  
 As the above cases show, integrated dualism cannot help but land the integrated dualist 
into some troubling moral outcomes in many cases and therefore cannot hold as an acceptable 
moral theory.  
 
Mere Conjunction Dualism 
 Upon first glance, mere conjunction seems to solve the problem faced by the other two 
forms of dualism. However, Lacey’s emphasis on adhering to benefits in accord with both 
utilitarianism with retributivism results in conflicting outcomes. Utilitarian considerations may 
quite conceivably call for not punishing or inflicting a lesser penalty on the offender in cases 
where it can be sure that the offender will not attack again. However, the retributivist 
consideration for punishment would call for punishing the offender to the full extent of his 
actions in order to restore the victim’s rights and balance morality regardless of how the offender 
is likely to act in the future. It seems we would have to determine which reaction is more suitable 
based on our judgment of the immoral action at hand. We cannot help but feel that this is 
problematic.  
Determining reactions to individual immoral actions should not be based on our judgment 
alone. Our judgments cannot be trusted to always make the right decision in every case for they 
are often subject to flaws, inconsistencies, and prejudices.  A feasible system of punishment 
serves as a mechanism for eliminating problems that may arise from using our judgment alone. 
Mere conjunction dualism does not provide such a mechanism and therefore cannot be 
considered a feasible system of punishment. A collaborative system required by mere 
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conjunction dualism requires appealing to our intuition in particular cases rather than some 
objective principle. Systems of punishment must obviously adhere to our judgments and 
intuitions to some extent but must ultimately have some objective prescription for coming to 
decisions. Mere conjunction dualism fails to provide an objective prescription. 
The unsatisfactory results from the application of mere conjunction dualist prevent it 
from succeeding either utilitarianism or retributivism as an optimal method of punishment.  
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Part III: Retributivist Problem of Proportionality  
1.1 Problem of Proportionality 
 Determining the adequate proportionality of punishment is the most difficult problem for 
the retributivist. Differences in physical and mental characteristics may result in certain 
offenders experiencing greater or lesser degrees of suffering from the exactly the same kinds of 
punishment. These differences in degrees of suffering felt by a punishment could quite feasibly 
result in unintended consequences for the moral balance. The example that follows serves to 
illustrate the varying degrees of moral retaliation felt by receivers of the same punishment. 
 Suppose two people, Jack and Jane, independently broke the arm of two children. Jack 
broke the left arm of a nine-year old boy with a baseball bat. Jane broke the left arm of another 
nine-year old boy with a baseball bat. Let us suppose that both boys are otherwise unharmed and 
except for the minor inconveniences of not being able to use both arms for a period of a few 
weeks. Strict application of lex talionis requires both Jack and Jane each get their left arms 
broken with a baseball bat. Aside from this one attack on a nine-year old boy, let us further 
suppose that Jack is otherwise a normal man who makes his living as a mid-level office 
employee. Other than the initial minor inconveniences of not being able to use both arms and 
type with both hands in the weeks it takes his arm to recover, Jack will remain otherwise 
unaffected. Unlike Jack, Jane will be severely affected from a break to her arm. Due to an 
accident she suffered as a child, Jane only has the use of her left hand without which she cannot 
work nor take care of her child and elderly mother who depend on her solely for their livelihood. 
Let us further suppose that because of a rare bone disorder, Jane’s arm will not recover fully if it 
is broken. In such a case, breaking Jane’s arm seems too harsh even given the morally wrong 
magnitude of Jane’s actions. Although required by a strict adherence to lex talionis, breaking 
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Jane’s arm seems to result in taking away more of her rights than required to restore moral 
balance in this particular case. As such, we feel inclined to propose an alternative punishment for 
Jane that more effectively aligns with the moral magnitude of the situation. In this case, the 
punishment may simply be putting some sort of restraints on one of Jane’s limbs in and keeping 
her from using it for the same duration of time it takes for the boy’s arm to recover.  
These difficulties in adequate proportionality of punishment as illustrated by the case 
above seem to require the retributivist examine each person, crime, and situation individually 
rather than strictly apply lex talionis to each situation. However, a practice that requires 
determination of punishment on a case-by-case basis cannot help but seem highly subjective and 
therefore unfeasible as a method of punishment. 
A system that so uniquely tailors to each unique moral violation threatens retributivism’s 
classification as a plausible theory of punishment. Due to the numerous threats the feasibility of 
proportional punishment poses for the retributivist, I have chosen to focus the following sections 
on providing an adequate solution to this problem. However in order to fully comprehend the 
feasible solution to the proportionality problem, it is critical to understand the difficulty in 
applying lex talionis even if we were to assume that physical and mental characteristics of all 
offenders were relatively similar.  
 
1.2 Hard Cases for Retributivism 
 The retributivist faces difficulties arising from the applications of lex talionis for certain 
unique moral wrongdoings where the “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” principles cannot strictly 
apply. This principle proves problematic for the retributivist in assigning punishments for certain 
hard cases where exact proportionality of punishment for moral wrong is difficult. In this section, 
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I will provide particular instances of hard cases that seem particularly problematic for the 
retributivist given the reliance on lex talionis. The particular instances of these hard cases I will 
describe include rape, child molestation, mass murder, and repeat offenders.  
 
Rape 
 Rape is perhaps the most widely discussed hard case for retributivism. In such a case lex 
talionis requires us to rape the rapist. However, we cannot help but feel uncomfortable with such 
a proposition. Furthermore raping a rapist does not seem to align with our intuitions of morality 
and punishment. Kant himself acknowledges that strict application of lex talionis in this case is 
problematic because repeating the act is “itself a punishable crime against humanity”. Kant says 
instead that the appropriate punishment for a rapist is castration.22 
 Two problems arise in Kant’s defense. First, the principle of lex talionis itself often 
requires us to perform actions that go against humanity in order to correct moral balance. The act 
of killing is certainly a crime against humanity and a moral crime Kant himself says must be 
punished by applying lex talionis. However, application of lex talionis requires us to kill the 
criminal and commit the punishable crime ourselves. Kant believes that in this case strict 
application of lex talionis is indeed acceptable and actually necessary in order to restore 
morality. On principle, this seems no different from raping the rapist for this too would simply be 
the act of duplicating the morally wrong action in order to correct moral imbalance through 
proportional punishment. Second, Kant’s solution of castrating the rapist does not seem 
proportional. As heinous and traumatic as rape may be for the victim, in most cases the physical 
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effects caused by rape are not permanent. In this way we could say that castration is worse than 
rape because it results in a permanent irreparable condition.23 Some victims of rape may 
experience permanent psychological trauma. However, castration could quite feasible result in 
permanent psychological trauma for the rapist. In such a case, castration seems more traumatic 
for the rapist then for the victim since the punishment inflicts both permanent psychological and 
physical trauma.  
 I concede that raping a rapist is an unacceptable form of punishment, but not because 
rape as a form of punishment is immoral in itself. I simply do not believe raping a rapist fully 
captures the moral gravity of the offense and as a result fails to establish moral proportionality 
required by retributivism. Even if we were to grant that we must rape the rapist in order to 
comply with the strict application lex talionis, it would quickly become apparent raping the rapist 
still fails the test of proportionality. Raping a rapist fails the test of proportionality because it 
fails to capture the full extent of the psychological trauma experienced by the victim. In such a 
case, the rapist would presumably know beforehand the punishment that he is to receive whether 
because a judge told him so in court or because he knows the consequences of such a crime in a 
system of punishment based on the lex talionis principle. This prior knowledge of the rape 
provides the rapist a level of psychological solace that his victim, who was not given such a 
warning, did not have. This prior knowledge allows the rapist time to mentally prepare for the 
punishment and prevents him from experiencing the psychological trauma from the rape to the 
same extent as the victim.  
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Child Molestation 
Although rape is the most widely discussed hard case for the retributivist, certain cases 
appear even more problematic for the retributivist. Child molestation is one such case. Child 
molestation seems most problematic for the retributivist because it is a case where lex talionis is 
impossible to apply. Even if the physical acts of the offender were applied exactly onto the 
offender, the offender would not experience the same physical pain or long-term psychological 
effects of the abuse. Direct application of the principle would require the offender himself to be 
turned into a child and grow up with the psychological and physical harms of the abuse in order 
to fully experience the extent of his abuse.24 Obviously such hard treatment is not feasible and as 
such designating appropriate punishments for child molesters becomes problematic for the 
retributivist.  
 
 Mass Murder 
 Mass murder proves to be another hard case for the retributivist where full application of 
lex talionis seems impossible. Unlike in the child molestation case above, direct duplication of 
the offender’s acts towards his victims is possible. For instance, if a mass murderer killed ten 
victims by shooting them on the back of the head, then it is certainly possible to kill the mass 
murderer by shooting him on the back of his head. Even though the punishment does align with 
the morally wrong nature of the offender’s actions, the punishment fails the proportionality test 
required by lex talionis. If a mass murderer kills ten victims, then it seems only fitting that ten 
lives must also be taken in order to restore balance of morality. However, because it is 
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impossible to kill a mass murderer ten times, it becomes impossible to establish a punishment 
that aligns with the proportionality requirement for lex talionis.  
 The issue illustrated by the mass murderer hard case poses a deep problem for the 
retributivist. A large part of the appeal of retributivism stems from the idea that administration of 
proportional crime results in a rebalancing of moral scales. However, the mass murderer case 
shows there exist certain situations where the crime is so bad that there is no feasible way of 
balancing moral scales. The capacity to balance moral scales is a critical component of 
retributivism. Failure to concretely define a method through which this moral balance can be 
achieved through administration of punishment implies a failure in a critical requirement of 
retributivism. Unless such an alternative method for administering proportional punishments in 
these particularly heinous cases is devised, retributivism cannot help but fail as a feasible method 
of punishment.  
 
Repeat Offenders 
Repeat offender cases prove uniquely problematic for the retributivist. Repeat offenders 
can be defined as people who have committed the same moral wrong again after already being 
punished for a previous moral wrong of the same nature. In such cases, we cannot help but 
instinctually feel as though an offender should be punished more harshly for repeating a moral 
wrong than he was in the first time. However, the application of lax talionis seems to require that 
we do not punish the offender any more harshly for repeating the same moral wrong a second, 
third, fourth, or even tenth time. In such a case the moral offender has already been punished for 
his previous acts of the same moral wrong and thereby moral balance for those previous acts 
have already been achieved. Harsher punishments for repeat offenders cannot help but seem 
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unfair to the offender himself who has already been adequately punished for previous crimes and 
now only has moral imbalance resulting from the current moral violation remaining. Any 
additional punishment can easily appear to come out from vengeance or some consequentialist 
desire, both of which the retributivist must stay committed to avoiding.  
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Part IV: Solution to Problem of Proportionality 
 
1.1 Solution to Problems of Proportionality 
 Lex taxlionis is not an idea that should be taken literally. It simply makes the most 
logical sense to define lex talionis as “eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth” but this simply implies 
that punishment should be proportional enough as to correct for moral imbalance, not that it must 
match exactly with what the wrongdoer took from his victim. This broader interpretation implied 
by lex talionis saves the retributivist from the burden of assessing each situation on a case-by-
case basis and allows for a range of acceptable punishments just as long as it effectively captures 
the magnitude of the moral wrong. Under the broader interpretation of lex talionis, it becomes 
possible to take into account differences in the individual offender circumstances and moral 
appropriateness of certain forms of punishment. The retributivist requirement for proportionality 
through the modified form of lex talionis can still be satisfied as long as it prescribes 
punishments that match the moral gravity of offense at hand and effectively restores the balance 
of morality.  
In the following section, I will illustrate how the broader interpretation of lex talionis can 
be incorporated into the retributivist theory of punishment. In order to illustrate the potential 
feasibility and effectiveness of modified lex talionis for the retributivist, I have devised a thought 
experiment among a group of peoples I refer to as Society R.  
 
1.2 Society R Thought Experiment 
I would like to make clear that my only intention in creating the Society R thought 
experiment is to show that an extended interpretation of lex talionis allows retributivism to 
44 
function as a feasible method of punishment. I will not delve precisely into the kinds of 
punishments that Society R administers or even discuss specifically all of the morally egregious 
acts encompassed by Society R’s system of punishment. Specific punishments and categories 
will undoubtedly continue to evolve in Society R as time progresses and therefore are of no 
relevance to the defense of the theory at hand.  
Imagine a Society R where a system of punishment is based entirely on punishing the 
morally guilty in order to restore the moral balance of its peoples. Like all civilizations, Society 
R also administers penalties, such as parking and speeding tickets, but do not consider parking 
for three hours in a two hour parking zone or speeding immoral. Rather, penalties are viewed as 
necessary in order to allow society to function smoothly and raise revenues beyond tax 
collection. These penalties differ from actual punishment by not carrying the reprobative 
function or moral condemnation underlying punishments. In order to guarantee proportional 
punishments for all crimes and avoid overly lax or harsh hard punishments, Society R has 
devised a system of punishment that is fair to all citizens and aligns with retributivist ideas of 
punishment.  
The system of punishment classifies everyone within Society R as belonging to one of 
five different categories of circumstances: men, women, the mentally ill, children, and repeat 
offenders. Each group of people is administered slightly differing punishments for the similarly 
morally egregious crimes due to the unique mental or physical differences of their societal 
category. These differences in punishments fully take into account the differences in mental and 
physical states of the offenders and recognize differing levels of suffering that may occur for the 
same punishments. Society R chooses punishments for particular crimes within these categories 
by taking input from and examining firsthand large cross-sections of people within the state.  
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Those who fall into the “men” category include those who are adult males aged eighteen 
and over. In order to fall into this category these men must not possess any physical or mental 
disabilities that would hinder them from receiving the kind of punishments deemed acceptable 
for men. 
The “women” category include adult females aged eighteen and over. In order to fall into 
this category these women must not possess any physical or mental disabilities that would hinder 
them from receiving the kind of punishments deemed acceptable for women.  
“Children” include all non-adult females and males below the age of eighteen. In order to 
fall into this category, these children must not possess any debilitating physical, mental, 
developmental abnormalities that might hinder the child from receiving punishments in the same 
way as normal children.  
The mentally ill include those who would fall into the above three categories were it not 
for some psychological condition that hinders them from perceiving punishments the same way 
as other men, women, and children. The punishments for those with mental illnesses include a 
larger array of options then those normally prescribed for men, women, and children due to the 
variety of different mental ailments that prevent some normal forms of punishment from being 
acceptable.   
Repeat offenders include those who have committed the same or similar types of offenses 
more than once. Repeat offenders have failed to comply with the punishments from their 
previous offenses and as a result must be punished for this failure as well as for the repeated 
offense itself. The system of punishment for repeat offenders will vary in severity depending on 
the moral gravity of the offense being considered. For instance, repeat offenses for stealing from 
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candy from a convenience store will not be treated as severely as repeat offenses for rape or 
murder.  
Society R recognizes that it is necessary to constantly review the relevance of the 
categories given the current state of society. For instance, if a new kind of people were to emerge 
such that they needed their own group Society R would need to devise adequate punishments for 
this group. In order to adapt to these changes, Society R constantly examines the potential need 
for new categories by maintaining awareness of changes in social tides and anticipating the 
necessity for such changes.  
Within each of these categories are five levels of different punishments viewed as 
acceptable for different kinds of immoral acts. The different levels of punishments include 
Level-1, Level-2, Level-3, Level-4 punishments, and Level-5 punishments. Each level of 
punishment is prescribed with a list of crimes for which the particular level’s punishments are 
intended.  
Level-1 Punishments are punishments for the most egregious acts of immorality. These 
include crimes effecting a large number of people such as mass acts of terror, human trafficking, 
mass child abduction. Level-2 Punishments are punishments for crimes that are still incredibly 
egregious but less so then for those that merit Level-1 Punishments. Acts that warrant Level-2 
Punishments could include punishments like rape, intentional murder, severe torture, and child 
molestation. Level-3 Punishments are punishments for crimes that that are less severe than for 
Level-2 Punishments. These include crimes such as unintended murder, severe assault, and 
extreme child neglect leading to physical, mental, or developmental harm.  Level-4 Punishments 
are punishments for acts of immorality less severe than the other three levels. Crimes that are 
classified under Level-4 Punishments include armed robbery, embezzlement, and forgery of 
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valuable work.   Level-5 Punishments are punishments for the least morally egregious crimes of 
the five levels. Crimes that are punishable under Level-5 punishments include such things as 
illegally obtaining monthly welfare checks by exaggerating paperwork, stealing small amounts 
of merchandise from stores or personal residences, and engaging in prostitution.  
It is true certainly true that at times unusual moral offenses may occur such that there 
does not yet exist a classification level for the given offense. In such cases it becomes necessary 
for society to be presented with the given facts and give input into which category the act 
belongs. Suppose still Society R is a rather efficient society where such facts can be laid out and 
all input from citizens given within the hours following a verdict. The inputs can then be tallied 
and summarized to determine which level of punishments the unusual moral offense belongs.  
Within these levels of punishment, the actual hard treatments administered differ based 
on category. For instance, those who fall in the “men” category will receive harsher treatments 
for the same acts against morality then those who fall in the “children” category. These 
differences occur because it is assumed that certain categories feel the adverse effects of hard 
treatment to a greater degree than others. In-line with the above example, those who fall into the 
“children” category undoubtedly more impacted by the moral consequences of a ten-year prison 
sentence than those who fall in the “men” category. Those who fall into the “children” category 
are just starting out their lives and as a result, a ten-year prison sentence can carry more moral 
gravity to the child who may miss out on critical developmental experiences such as sitting in a 
normal classroom and experiencing the love and support from one’s parents. As a result, the 
trauma and psychological damage that may result from child’s ten-year prison sentence will 
likely be greater than that experienced by an adult. Although a ten-year prison sentence for those 
who fall in the “man” category is still a hefty punishment, the moral gravity and consequences of 
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a ten-year sentence for men will unlikely be as high as it is for a child. Therefore, in Society R a 
ten-year sentence for a child will most likely be administered for a relatively more egregious 
crime while a ten-year sentence for a man will likely be doled out for relatively less egregious 
crimes. These differences in moral gravity of the same punishment felt by those belonging in 
different categories must be taken into account when assigning proportional punishments to 
levels of crimes. By effectively utilizing the broad interpretation of lex talionis, Society R 
assumes that all punishments within each level play the same role in balancing for immoral acts. 
All Level-1 Punishments are equal for all crimes prescribed Level-1 punishments, all Level-2 
Punishments are equal for all crimes prescribed Level-2 Punishments, and so forth.   
In the following sections I will use my application of retributivist principles in Society R 
to prove retributivism can indeed provide adequate responses to “hard cases” where proper 
distribution of punishment seems problematic. I will also prove that retributivism provides 
morally justified answers to the most widely debated methods of punishment.  
 
1.3 Solution to Hard Cases 
 The broader interpretation of lex talionis, which serves as a solution to the proportionality 
problem, provides the basis for solving the problems the retributivist faces with hard cases. 
When allowing for only a strict interpretation of lex talionis, the hard cases described above 
seem problematic because it appeared impossible to administer punishments for certain cases 
that capture both the moral gravity of the act and align with our intuitions of a morally 
acceptable form of punishment. I will now utilize the broader interpretation of lex talionis and 
the hypothetical Society R created with this broader interpretation in mind to explain how the 
retributivst can provide solutions to these hard cases. By providing answers to these hard cases 
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through application of retributivist ideals, I seek to prove retributivism’s effectiveness and 
superiority as a functional theory of punishment.  
 
Rape 
 Kant claims that rape itself is an unacceptable form of punishment for the rapist because 
the punishment itself is a “crime against humanity” and proposes castrating the rapist instead. I 
proposed that raping a rapist does not capture the full magnitude of moral gravity of the offense 
due to the advanced notice the offender will get of the punishment. 
 A broad interpretation of lex talionis can help solve both Kant’s worries and my own. I 
remain unconvinced that rape as a form of punishment can really be classified as a crime against 
humanity when we condone committing many other morally egregious actions, such as murder, 
in order to obtain moral balance. It appears Kant is motivated more by the social constructs of his 
time that finds such punishments distasteful and unacceptable, rather than objectionable on 
retributivist grounds. However, the broad interpretation of lex talionis makes room for such 
disagreements while still allowing for adherence to the core principles of retributivism. Broader 
lex talionis allows Kant to adhere to his inclination that rape is a morally unacceptable form of 
punishment by providing an additional acceptable range of punishments he can choose from. A 
larger acceptable range of punishments also allows for a reevaluation of whether castration is an 
acceptable form of punishment. I am inclined to conclude that if wider choices of punishments 
became available, the grossly disproportionate nature of castration as punishment for rape will 
quickly become apparent.  
Permitting a range of punishments also allows us to answer the worry that rape as a 
punishment itself does not capture the full magnitude of the moral gravity associated with the 
50 
crime. Under this revised interpretation, we can simply allow for a range of punishments that is 
morally proportional to rape and in effect successfully restores the balance of morality. Such a 
punishment would effectively capture the amount of physical and psychological suffering 
experienced by the victim. One such permissible form of punishment may include subjecting the 
rapist to years of hard labor that is both psychologically and physically traumatic. The rapist 
should not be released from this labor until both the psychological and physical trauma 
experienced by the victim has ended. As in Society R, it is quite likely that other feasible forms 
of punishments exist that function equally well to restore moral balance. I will not determine 
exactly what punishments may be included in this complete list of punishments at this time for 
devising such a list would require us to take into account a large number of considerations 
beyond the scope of this work. However, specific instances of acceptable punishments are not 
critical for solving the issues at hand. I must simply show that devising a system of proportional 
punishment to offset the moral offense of rape is conceivably feasible.  
  
Child Molestation 
 Through the broader interpretation of lex talionis, the issue with child molestation seems 
much easier to solve. Although it is not possible to duplicate the moral wrong on the offender 
while capturing the level of psychological trauma of the inflicted children, the broad 
interpretation makes it possible to administer proportional punishment. The punishment itself 
and the type of psychological impact of the punishment will undoubtedly be different from the 
suffering felt by children, but under the broader interpretation it becomes possible to administer a 
punishment that at least encompasses the magnitude of the moral wrong. Encompassing the 
moral magnitude of the act serves to effectively restore moral balance and carry out the 
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retributivist function of punishment. Such an act may allow, and indeed even call for, a hard 
treatment that could be perceived as cruel and unusual punishment. An example of such a 
punishment could include repeatedly beating or violating the violator until it is deemed the level 
of psychological trauma experienced is equal to that of the violator’s victim  
Although punishments like the above may be unappealing to some, such is required for 
balancing morality and adequately obtaining justice. Unappealing hard treatments are not 
necessarily detrimental for the retributivist because hard treatments whether in the form of 
penalties or punishments are readily accepted as having an unpleasant nature. However, moral 
intuitions tell us that even though they are unpleasant there are times when hard treatments are 
still necessary. Such is no different with punishments perceived as cruel and unusual. The only 
difference is that the hard treatment itself invokes a kind of unpleasant nature because of the 
magnitude of moral wrong in question. 
 
Repeat Offenders 
More harshly punishing repeat offenders becomes defensible under the broad 
interpretation of lex talionis. This broader interpretation allows us to view repeat offenders, those 
who have committed the same or similar kinds of crimes, as more punishable than those who 
have only committed the crime once. Under this system, repeat offenders can be said to have 
performed a more egregious act on morality by committing same crime more than once. When a 
repeat offender chooses to commit the same act of immorality again he is showing society that he 
has “failed to organize his life in a way that reduces the risk of his reoffending”.25 Through this 
approach we can assume that every time an offender is punished for an act of egregious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Youngjae Lee, "Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account” in FLASH (Fordham Law 
School, 2008), 611 
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immorality, we add an additional unspoken punishment- an order for the offender to reorganize 
his life so that such incidents do not occur again in the future. Repeat offenses shows that the 
offender has failed to comply with this punishment and reorganize his life. Therefore, these 
offenders must be punished additionally in order to restore morality not only for the repeated 
offense itself but also for the offense of failing to comply with a previous punishment.  
 
Mass Murder 
 Despite its obvious solutions to many of the other problems, the broader interpretation of 
lex talionis still does not provide an adequate punishment for mass murder. Mass murder 
somehow requires we capture the pain suffered by the number of people the offender put to 
death. This does not seem possible because a single offender only has one life to give. It is true 
that in such cases we cannot completely replicate the magnitude of wrongdoing in murder, 
however all the retributivist can do in such a case is punish the act to the fullest extent possible in 
order to capture the magnitude of the pain. The closest adequate replications may call for some 
forms of perceived cruel and unusual punishment that retributivism does indeed allow.  
 Some may object that this failure of the retributivist to account for mass murder proves 
retributivism failure as a theory of punishment. Although such an objection may seem 
compelling at first glance, upon closer inspection we find the objection holds no merit. The 
following case explains why failure of proportionality in the mass murderer case is not 
detrimental to retributivism. 
 Suppose a man, let us call him Mass Murderer, murderers ten people by first torturing 
and burning them until they die. It seems plausible to say that in such a case the immorality 
suffered by any individual is unimaginably great. As a result, we can say that the degree of 
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immorality felt by each individual is equal to some inconceivably large number. Since this 
degree of suffering is so large, it seems quite feasible to say that this number is approaching 
something very close to infinity. The moral gravity of the act is not actually infinity but because 
the moral offense is so inconceivably great for all practical purposes we can assume that the 
gravity of the offense is at the level infinity. Because Mass Murderer committed ten of such 
egregious acts, the degree of suffering he committed can only be described as ten times infinity. 
However, nothing can actually be greater than infinity. Even though we might say it is ten times 
infinity in order to express the moral gravity of Mass Murderer’s act, there is no possible way to 
express anything larger than infinity. The equations below illustrate the impossibility of 
expressing ten times an amount of suffering when the immorality of the act is inconceivably 
great.   
 
Degree of pain felt by one victim of torture and murder = ∞ 
Degree of pain felt by ten victims of torture and murder = 10∞ = ∞ 
 
The equations above illustrate that even though mass murder seems impossible to punish 
proportionally from the outset, egregious crimes can be punished enough at least to adequately 
balance the immorality of the action. In Mass Murderer’s case, the proportional punishment is 
anything that is at least equal to the unimaginable loss suffered by one victim.  In order to fulfill 
the degree of proportional punishment, seemingly cruel and unusual punishments may be 
utilized.  
 One may reject my analysis and say that torturing and killing one person can never be 
equal to torturing and killing ten, fifteen, or even 10,000 people. Such an obvious and intuitive 
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objection should not be disregarded, but is still not completely detrimental for the retributivist. 
The equations posed above do not imply that the heinous murder of one person is completely 
akin to the heinous murder of ten people. It is simply saying that for the purposes of such 
proportional punishment, the differences between the two can be disregarded because the moral 
gravity of just one instance of torture and murder is already so inconceivably great. However, 
since it cannot be completely disregarded that there does exist some difference I will pose 
another method of determining punishments for Mass Murderer such that proportionality is not 
completely achieved but feasible enough to save retributivism from complete downfall.  
 In order to pose a different solution to the Mass Murder case described above, I will 
begin by describing a less extreme moral crime from which we can draw certain relevant 
analogies. Think of a case where a man, let us call him White Collar Criminal, embezzles 
millions of dollars from his company. White Collar Criminal is eventually discovered and found 
guilty of these crimes. Obviously, the morally right punishment would be for White Collar 
Criminal to return the embezzle millions. However let us suppose that at this point White Collar 
Criminal lacks the adequate funds or capital to repay the company for the embezzled millions.  
In this case, it seems White Collar Criminal should be required to repay the company as much as 
he possibly can. Although the amount paid and amount stolen will never be equal and therefore 
not exactly proportional in such a case, this is quite conceivably the most that can be done.  
 Much like White Collar Criminal above, Mass Murderer cannot be punished to the full 
extent of his crimes. As much true adherence to retributivism seems to require Mass Murderer be 
killed ten times, such treatment is simply not feasible. The closest we can get in such a case is to 
torture and kill Mass Murderer in the most grossly heinous way possible. Such a punishment 
may include something like water boarding Mass Murderer fifty times before finally subjecting 
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him to death by eating alive by insects. Given the harsh nature of the hard treatment inflicted on 
Mass Murderer, it would be difficult for anyone to say that we are valuing Mass Murderer’s 
rights above those of his victims. Even though such a hard treatment may still fail to meet the 
morally egregious magnitude of murdering ten people so we cannot say that morality has been 
perfectly balanced, we can still say that morality has been adequately rebalanced. 
  
1.4 Justification for Cruel and Unusual Punishment  
 In many of my solutions to hard cases, retributivism endorses seemingly cruel and 
unusual punishment as a plausible method of punishment and in some extreme cases even 
require it in order to meet the level of proportionality retributivism strives towards.  I 
acknowledge that this view is controversial among modern policy makers who must make laws 
that adhere to certain social trends in order to gain approval from constituents. I further 
acknowledge that due to the complexities of implementing policy, considerations for punishment 
must go beyond strictly proportionality. Due to the complicated nature of policy, policy-making 
is beyond my area of expertise so I will not delve into it any further at this time. My goal is to 
prove that at times punishments considered cruel and unusual must be administered in order to 
adhere to the retributivist ideals of proportionality. Furthermore, I seek to prove that categorizing 
certain punishments as cruel and unusual is a gross misnomer of certain punishment when 
administered in response to certain heinous crimes and when no other proportional punishments 
are conceivable. 
 To begin, let us assume that there exists such a things as cruel and unusual punishments. 
These punishments can include the vast array of punishments often considered unjust, such as 
quartering and starvation. These punishments are indeed displeasing to hear about and might 
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defy certain common sense humanitarian notions we have about justice, but are necessary given 
the moral requirements of retributivism. For instance, imagine a scenario as in the case with 
Mass Murderer above where he first tortures and kills his victims. Suppose the torture includes 
starvation and tearing of limbs before burning. In such a case, it does not seem adequate to 
humanely kill Mass Murderer by subjecting him to some kind of ordinary method of killing like 
lethal injection or even the electric chair. The suffering experienced through lethal injection does 
not fully encompass the moral gravity of his actions and will thereby fail to balance morality in 
the way that retributivism requires. In fact, humanely killing Mass Murderer arguably is morally 
objectionable because it seemingly values Mass Murderer’s life over that of his victims. In order 
to align with retributivist ideals and respect the moral rights of his victims, Mass Murderer must 
also be painfully tortured and kill.    
 Some may say that it is this characteristic of allowing for cruel and unusual treatment that 
proves detrimental for retributivism as a feasible theory of punishment. These detractors will say 
that a system that subjects its citizens to such objectionable hard treatments is itself immoral. 
Despite the compelling nature of this argument, it fails because of its subjective nature. 
Classifying certain punishments as cruel and unusual and others as not leads us down a slippery 
slope. Due to the evolving nature of society, it is certainly conceivable that we may reach a point 
where all punishments are considered cruel and unusual. At what point is a punishment cruel and 
unusual and at what point is it acceptable? Punishments go in and out of favor constantly as a 
result of evolving social climate within societies. This is to be expected in practice. However, we 
must not let these evolving opinions on hard treatments themselves effect our respect for the 
absolute moral rights. Since utilitarianism proves implausible and dualist theories continue to 
remain problematic, we can only conclude that retributivist ideals of punishment must remain 
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intact unless another more plausible theory of punishment can be formulated. Formulating 
another theory of punishment seems unlikely at best given the multifaceted requirements of 
punishment and morality that only retributivism has successfully reconciled thus far. 
Furthermore, a closer analysis of what it means for something to be cruel and unusual prove that 
referring to any kind of proportional punishment as a cruel and unusual punishment is a 
misnomer in itself. 
 It is certainly true that some punishments may not seem appealing and we would not wish 
such a treatment on anyone. However, this alone is not enough to classify punishments as cruel 
and unusual. For a punishment to be truly cruel and unusual, it must be valued in relation to the 
crime the punishment strives to balance. It is only when the punishment grossly exceeds the 
magnitude of the crime that the punishment can be classified as both cruel and unusual. 
 To explain why the term “cruel and unusual punishment” is a misnomer when the 
particular punishment is administered for an equally heinous crime, we must accurately define 
the words “cruelty” and “unusual”. “Cruelty” is “callous indifference to or pleasure in causing 
pain and suffering”.26 “Unusual” simply that something is “not habitually commonly occurring 
or done”.27 
 Punishment completely lacks the characteristics of cruelty outlined in the definition 
above. For the retributivist, punishment is not administered with indifference or pleasure. As the 
case with Society R and broad interpretation of lex talionis illustrate, careful considerations are 
made in determining punishments for morally egregious acts. Far from being indifferent, the 
work required devising a feasible system of punishments through retributivism like in Society R 
that is sensitive to both the moral rights of the victims and certain limitations of the moral 	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wrongdoers. These punishments are not administered for pleasure but rather out of necessity to 
respect the rights of victims and restore moral imbalance. Punishments are not intended to bring 
pleasure to those administering them. Punishments cannot be considered cruel in themselves 
because they are merely moral responses that are morally equivalent to the moral wrongness it 
restores. Punishments can only be considered cruel when they are grossly disproportionate to the 
immoral act that it is trying to offset. In these cases, the degree of over-punishment may indeed 
be motivated by callous indifference or pleasure in causing suffering. However, punishing 
criminal beyond the extent of the moral wrongdoing is not permissible through retributivism. 
Because punishments fail to meet the definitional requirements to be considered “cruel”, 
referring to even the harshest form of punishment under retributivism as such is a misnomer that 
does not accurately describe the nature of punishment.  
I will grant that certain punishments under retributivism can be described as unusual. 
Certain punishments will obviously not be administered very often because certain moral 
wrongdoings are not committed very often. Therefore, the punishments for these moral 
wrongdoings would logically only be given out in very few cases and must meet the threshold of 
being “unusual”. Administering “unusual punishments” for “unusual crimes” seems to make 
logical sense to meet the requirements of proportionality for retributivism.   
Classifying punishments as cruel and unusual simply by the nature of the punishments 
alone is an oversimplification of the requirements and misunderstands the nature and function of 
punishment as illustrated through clarifying the definitions for cruel and unusual. Still, some 
dissenters may say that cruel and unusual punishment has its own implications beyond simply 
the definition of the words “cruel” and “unusual” considered separately. These dissenters could 
say that because the term “cruel and unusual punishment” has been widely used, it possesses a 
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definition distinct from the meanings of the words taken separately. I concede that this may 
indeed be true, but even still does not pose any problems for the retributivist. For the remainder 
of the section I seek to define the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” and show that 
retributivist punishments escape this classification. 
Numerous definitions for cruel and unusual punishment exist, perhaps contributing to the 
confusion of exactly what constitutes as cruel and unusual punishments. Raging debates exist as 
to which definition of cruel and unusual punishment is correct, as anyone who has skimmed over 
the numerous court rulings on the Eighth Amendment can attest. Attempts to reconcile the vague 
wording of the Founding Fathers in the Eighth Amendment have resulted in rulings that only 
agree, “revolving standards of decency mark the progress of a maturing society”.28 Attempts to 
encompass all of the punishments that may be considered cruel and unusual have all failed. 
Often, society finds reasons to add more punishments to this list or take some off the list and 
reinstate it as an acceptable form of punishment. Such differences must be accepted in a reality 
where ideas and practices must constantly evolve. However, logically there must be a way to 
define exactly which characteristics make a certain method of punishment cruel and unusual.  
Despite the differences in practice, all attempts at defining cruel and unusual punishments 
generally agree that it includes “punishments that are very harsh and too severe for the crime”.29 
Since there seems to be little consensus beyond this, I will use the criteria outlined in this 
definition as the basis for my reasoning that punishment by itself cannot be cruel and unusual.  
 Punishments are composed of both the hard treatment aspect of punishment and have a 
reprobative symbolic function that condemns certain actions. A punishment fails when one or 
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both of these functions are not met. Usually, we think these functions are not met when the 
punishment is not harsh enough to match the crime. However, we often fail to consider that these 
punishments also fail when they exceed the level we consider acceptable.  
Consider once again the case where we sentence a bike thief to death. This grossly 
punishes a relatively petty crime and fails to correctly offset the imbalance of morality. 
Sentencing the bike thief to death would directly go against the goals of retributivism by 
offsetting the balance of morality too far. This gross over punishment of the bike thief would 
result in a paradoxical scenario where the punishers themselves would have to be punished in 
order to correctly restore the balance of morality. Due to the harshness and severity of the 
punishment compared to the crime, the sentencing of the thief to death is considered a cruel and 
unusual punishment in this case. It is not that the punishment of sentencing to death is cruel and 
unusual in itself, but when applied to this particular case the punishment reaches beyond the 
severity of the crime.  
It is quite plausible that dissenters will object to my line of reasoning by holding onto the 
idea that certain hard treatments are completely unacceptable forms of punishment no matter the 
crime.  Saying punishments cannot be considered cruel and unusual in themselves do not align 
with our usual beliefs on the absolute nature of any kind of hard treatment. Most hard treatments 
can be judged on the basis of its moral consequences on the inflicted. However, punishment 
cannot be valued in this way because it is a different type of hard punishment. Although absolute 
classification as cruel and unusual is acceptable practice for most types of hard treatment, this 
does not hold true for punishment. Punishment is not simply a hard treatment in itself. It is a 
response to a certain action performed by the receiver of the treatment. Therefore, in order to 
judge the true nature of punishment we must mirror it to the hard treatment performed by the 
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receiver of the punishment on his victims. The purpose of the hard treatment through punishment 
is to mirror the full extent of the heinous or immoral nature of the act in question. Therefore, if 
retributivism is correctly applied it will ensure that the punishment is never too severe for the 
immoral action in question. The application of this idea to Society R below illustrates the 
injustices and consistencies that result from not performing certain hard treatments as 
punishments. 
 Suppose there are two criminals awaiting punishments in Society R. Let us call them 
Killer 1 and Killer 2. Killer1 killed his wife in a blind rage by strangling her when she threatened 
to leave him for another man. Killer 2 is a different kind of criminal. Killer 2 is a serial killer 
who preys on children. Before his arrest, Killer 2 preyed on children who were left temporarily 
unsupervised in playgrounds. Killer 2 then tortured the children for a period of five days. After 
the five days, Killer 2 put each child in an enclosed box filled with flesh-eating insects where 
they were slowly eaten to death.  
 Both Killer 1 and Killer 2 are murderers. However, one cannot help but get the sense that 
Criminal 1’s crime of passion is less heinous than Killer 2’s torture and murder of children. Due 
to these differences, Killer1’s actions would most likely be given a Level-2 punishment and 
Killer 2’s actions would likely be given a Level-1 punishment. When describing Level-1 and 
Level-2 punishments, I did not include exactly the types of punishments that could possibly fit 
into these two levels of punishment. Such differences were not relevant in order to comprehend 
the functions of lex talionis. Explaining modified lex talionis only requires understanding that 
some difference exists between these two levels of punishment in order to capture the differences 
in moral gravity of more heinous crimes from less heinous ones. However in order to more 
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comprehensively illustrate the significance of these crimes, I will assign hypothetical 
punishments for each level.  
 For Killer 1, the appropriate Level-2 punishment is rather obvious. Because he took a life 
by strangling his wife, it only makes sense to take his life by some method of asphyxiation or 
through some other method that would generate a comparable level of suffering. Such an act 
would effectively achieve justice and restore the balance of morality. For Killer 2, the 
punishment seems much more complex. Observation of lex talionis requires a punishment 
harsher than the one administered to Killer 1. However, if one were to adhere to the notion that 
torture is a cruel and unusual treatment that cannot be used by society as a form of punishment, 
the closest we could get to balance morality for Killer 2’s crime would be to find some humane 
way to end Killer 1’s life. However, such treatment fails to capture the magnitude of Killer 2’s 
crime and does not adequately differentiate his actions from Killer 1’s actions. Administering a 
similar punishment for Killer 2 as for Killer 1 would certainly fail to effectively offset 
immorality and achieve justice for Killer 2’s actions. Killer 2 did not simply intentionally murder 
one person. He tortured and painfully took the lives of innocent children. In order to restore 
morality and justice, Killer 2 must be punished to the fullest extent as to encompass the severe 
moral magnitude of his crimes. Common sense tell us that Killer 2 must be punished beyond the 
extent Killer 1 is punished in order to effectively adhere to lex talionis. However, the gravity of 
Killer 1’s crime calls for him to be killed. Therefore, Killer 2’s punishment must include an 
element of punishment beyond simply being killed. In order to go beyond this threshold, lex 
talionis calls for some other action that can only be satisfied through some form of torture or 
prolonged punishment before death. In such a case, the hard treatment of torture is not a form of 
cruel or unusual punishment. Rather, torture acts as a necessary balancing instrument for 
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carrying out the fundamental requirements of punishment. Torture cannot be considered cruel in 
this case because it does not come from indifference or desire for pleasure, but rather as a 
necessary means for achieving proportionality.   
 Clarifying the requirements for cruel and unusual punishment allows retributivism to 
administer hard treatments that adhere to lex talionis. As an application of the thought 
experiment Society R shows, not allowing for hard treatments simply due to evolving societal 
constructs results in an unavoidable inadequacy of punishments that at times fail to correctly 
carry out justice and balance morality.  
 
1.5 The Death Penalty  
 It is impossible to give an explanation for cruel and unusual punishment without 
following up with a defense of the death penalty. The death penalty has a prominent role in the 
discussion of cruel and unusual punishment and is largely debated among theorists and policy-
makers alike. Justice, however, requires the death penalty remains a suitable means of 
punishment under lax talionis. A proportional system of punishment presupposes the existence 
of the death penalty. Without being able to utilize the death penalty, it becomes impossible to 
adhere to any version of lax talionis, which requires that the punishment fit the crime.  
Some may say that life in prison is functionally equivalent to the death penalty with the 
absence of the inherently unpleasant associations often present when taking away a life. 
However, life is prison does not capture the full moral wrongness of murder. The very fact that 
we naturally feel less revulsion at the prospect of life in prison then subjecting a criminal to 
death illustrates this fact. Our discomfort in taking away ones life speaks to the reason we feel 
that murder itself is such an egregious moral wrong. We are more comfortable with permanent 
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imprisonment because it is instinctively not as morally egregious. In almost all circumstances, 
continuing to life is preferably to dying because as long as a person continues to exist he or she 
still preserves some hope and potential for a valuable future.  
The numbers of death row inmates who seek to overturn their sentencing through appeals 
or other legal methods prove the preference of life over death even in the most extreme 
circumstances. From 1973 to 2013 8,466 death sentences were imposed across the United States. 
Of these sentences, 6,432 death sentences were overturned for various reasons, most commonly 
through appeals.30 
 Some staunch opponents of the death penalty may reasonable conclude that the 
objectionable nature of capital punishment alone creates an unresolvable problem for the 
retributivist. Without the death penalty, punishment for murder like those committed by both 
Killer 1 and Killer 2 become nearly impossible to punish in accordance with lax talionis.  
Bedeau attempts to salvage retributivism from this problem by accepting that absolute 
proportionality of punishments for crimes may not be feasible when dealing with morally 
egregious acts such as murder. Bedeau claims this does not pose a serious threat to retributivism, 
however, as long as we allow for relative proportionality where the most heinous crimes are still 
punished more than less morally objectionable crimes. This proposed modified system requires 
“crimes other than murder be punished with terms of imprisonment or other deprivations less 
severe than those used in the punishment of murder”.31 Although such a compromise is indeed 
compelling, it still fails to adhere to the fundamental nature of lax talionis that requires criminals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Frank R. Baumgartner, “Most Death Penalty Sentences are Overturned. Here’s why that 
Matters” in The Washington Post, 2015.  
31 Hugo Adam Bedau, “The Case Against the Death Penalty” in ACLU Capital Punishment 
Project, 1984), 3. 	  
65 
be punished to the exact extent they violate morality. Modifying the system the way Bedeau 
proposes leads the way into a system of punishment that is too lenient on offenders and thereby 
fails to correctly counterbalance the immoral nature of not just the most egregious crimes 
involving murder but all immoral acts in general. Accepting Bedeau’s proposed modifications 
would result in a complete failure of the basic goals of retributivism that strive to restore moral 
balance to society. The application of Bedeau’s ideas to a hypothetical case illustrates the 
absurdity of Bedeau’s proposed modification.  
 Let us once again consider the case of Killer 1 and Killer 2 described in the previous 
section. This time, we will prescribe punishments for these two moral wrongdoers using 
Bedeau’s restrictions for administering punishment, which no longer allows for the death penalty 
or application of lex talionis and only concerns itself with relative proportionality.  In line with 
these new restrictions, Killer 2 is sentenced to one year in prison and Killer 1 some less amount, 
say three months in prison. Also waiting to be sentenced in the same room as Killer 1 and Killer 
2 is Kidnapper. Kidnapper has been convicted of kidnapping a girl at the age of five and held her 
captive until she turned eighteen. Other than the fact that he did not let her out of the boundaries 
of his large estate, he did not treat his victim poorly. The girl was well fed, educated, and 
properly cared for. Despite the lack of physical discomforts, the girl knew and understood her 
predicament and wished for freedom. Kidnapper is sentenced to one month in prison.  
In the above example, the punishments do appear relatively proportional. Killer 2 faces a 
longer prison sentence than Killer 1 and faces a longer prison sentence than Kidnapper. 
However, despite this adherence to relative proportionality we cannot help but get the sense that 
a gross injustice still remains. It goes against common sense intuitions of justice to allow Killer 
2, who brutally tortured and killed children, to only be sentenced to one year in prison. Similarly, 
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it seems unjust to punish Killer 1 with only three months in prison for killing his wife.  In both 
Killer 1’s and Killer 2’s cases we cannot help but feel that the immorality of the crime has not 
been offset and justice has not been served. Furthermore, due to the gravity of the acts committed 
by Killer 1 and Killer 2 we are forced to administer a punishment for Kidnapper that is less 
severe then the punishment for the other two crimes. Although relative proportionality may seem 
appealing the way it is proposed by Bedeau, it has some uncomfortable implications for 
punishment. By accepting a modified notion of retributivism that denies the acceptability of the 
death penalty, we end up with a system of punishment that does not punish criminals enough 
given the extreme immoral nature of certain acts.  
I acknowledge that the above example is rather exaggerated and the punishments are 
absurdly lenient given the heinous nature of the crimes described. However, such an 
exaggeration proved necessary in order to effectively communicate the absurdity of eliminating 
the death penalty. When the primary goal of punishments is to effectively restore imbalances in 
morality due to the nature of heinous crimes, we cannot simply eliminate a primary method of 
restoring immorality. Doing so would lead us into a position like the one above where crimes are 
constantly under-punished and moral balance is not restored.  
Thus far, I have proven that any feasible system of retributivist justice must allow for 
capital punishment. This still does not prove that capital punishment is not in itself a form of 
cruel and unusual punishment. Unless I can prove that capital punishment is itself a morally 
acceptable form of punishment, the retributivist reliance on capital punishment to fulfill specific 
criteria for lax talionis becomes problematic. In order for retributivism to remain a feasible and 
just method of punishment, I must prove capital punishment in itself cannot be considered cruel 
and unusual when applied to the right circumstances. For the remainder of this section I will 
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outline some common objections to the death penalty. I will then show that despite the 
compelling nature and accuracy of some of these objections, they still fail to prove that capital 
punishment is a cruel and unusual method of punishment in all circumstances.  
Although dissenters may disagree on specific details, they generally oppose capital 
punishment for two overarching reasons. First, dissenters oppose capital punishment because 
they believe that it does not effectively deter crime. Second, dissenters believe that the death 
penalty is uncivilized in theory and unfair and inequitable in practice.32 These two overarching 
objections certainly hold some validity. However, we can disregard certain elements of these 
objections right away due to its relevance only in application. Although these considerations are 
important for the implementation of capital punishment, many are of no relevance when only 
considering the logical and moral nature of the retributivist method of punishment. Certain 
elements of the two main objections to capital punishment are more problematic and must be 
given further explanation to show that although these weaknesses in capital punishment may in 
fact exist, it still fails to prove capital punishment is a type of cruel and unusual punishment in 
itself.  
Some compelling reasoning supports the dissenters’ objection that punishments do not 
effectively deter crime. Bedeau reasons that in order for punishment to serve as an effective 
deterrent, the punishment must consistently be applied in every case.33 However, currently only 
one percent of homicides known to the police are sentenced to the death penalty. Such an 
inconsistent application cannot possibly serve to effectively deter potential murderers when there 
is only a one percent chance of being sentenced to death upon conviction. Although this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Hugo Adam Bedau, “The Case Against the Death Penalty” in ACLU Capital Punishment 
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argument does provide support for the ineffectiveness of capital punishment, this only proves 
that our current implementation of the death penalty contains flaws. In theory, retributivism 
requires that moral imbalances be corrected in order to accurately offset any imbalances in 
morality so that such inconsistencies like the one mentioned do not occur.  
Bedeau also states capital punishment’s failure of deterrence arises because murder is 
usually either extensively premeditated or arise from crimes of passion. Bedeau argues that 
murderers who extensively premeditate their actions will not be deterred for they will take 
measures to escape detection. Those who commit crimes of passion will also not be deterred 
from the threat of punishment because such crimes only result when logical thinking has been 
suspended and therefore consequences of such actions are not taken into account.34 Bandeau also 
states that if excessive punishment were to result in deterrence then long prison sentences must 
be just as effective as capital punishment.  
Bandeau states that long-term punishments rather than capital punishment would actually 
more effectively deter crime for it would eliminate crimes by those who hope for “suicide-by-
execution”.35 Bandeau describes suicides-by-executions as circumstances in which people wish 
to die but fear taking their own lives. Therefore, in order to fulfill their wishes, they take the lives 
of others in hopes that society will execute them. The inefficient nature of deterrence for capital 
punishment is indeed concerning for policy-makes who strive to reap the most positive benefits 
from punishment as possible. However, retributivism’s goal in administering proportional 
punishment is not deterrence. Rather, its goal is to strictly offset imbalances in morality by 
administering punishments proportional to the crime. Any unintentional benefit, such as 
deterrence, from obtaining such a goal is simply a fortunate byproduct but bears no significance 	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for retributivism. Retributivism’s only goal is to administer punishments that correct match the 
magnitude of the crime at hand. If the punishment that most appropriately matches the moral 
gravity of the crime happens to be the death penalty, then such a punishment must be 
administered in order to effectively offset the immorality of the wrongdoer’s actions.  
The apparent failure of capital punishment as an effective method of deterrence does not 
provide sufficient evidence that the death penalty is a form of cruel and unusual punishment. 
Rather, it simply shows that as it has been implemented thus far the death penalty does not 
function as a punishment that encourages deterrence among murderers. However, the above 
reasoning offers no evidence that suggests that capital punishment when correctly administered 
is too severe for the given crime. Therefore despite the compelling evidence that proves 
deterrence may not be an objective of capital punishment, this argument fails to prove that 
capital punishment is itself is a cruel and unusual punishment that cannot be used in order to 
meet the requirements of proportionality for retributivism.  
 Bedeau also says capital punishment should be outlawed due to its unfair and barbaric 
nature. I will first delve into Bedeau’s reasoning for the unfair nature of capital punishment. 
Bedeau reasons that when it comes to irreversible and serious punishments, such as capital 
punishment, the sentencing must be conducted with fundamental fairness. Bedeau cites data 
showing trends of disproportionately large numbers of African Americans on death row relative 
to their fraction of the total population. Bedeau cites more data showing gender also plays a role 
in sentencing with women who commit murders are much less likely to face execution. Finally, 
Bedeau provides evidence suggesting that capital punishment is disproportionately sentenced to 
the poor with 90 percent of those on death row unable to afford a lawyer. Bedeau does not 
believe that such instances of unfairness can ever be completely eliminated due to the potential 
70 
for biases that exist every step of the way right up until execution. The prosecution might choose 
to try for a lesser crime. The court may be unwilling to accept or reject a guilty plea. The jury 
may choose to convict for manslaughter or second-degree murder rather than capital murder. The 
jury or judge may question the defendant’s sanity.36 These factors are just a few of the complex 
dimensions leading up to a death row sentence.  
 Once again, I believe that Bedeau does indeed bring up several compelling objections to 
retributivism. In current practice, unavoidable prejudices certainly exist throughout the entire 
justice system. These prejudices may result unfair discrimination for disproportionate number of 
people from certain groups. However, this still does not prove capital punishment itself is an 
unfair, inappropriate, or cruel and unusual punishment. It simply shows that policymakers must 
improve the justice system so that capital punishment is applied consistently for crimes where 
this punishment is appropriate. More lenient sentencing for certain groups does not prove that 
capital punishment itself is unfair or unnecessarily cruel. In fact, in some cases capital 
punishment may still be the fairest punishment and these other more lenient sentences could 
actually be more representative of unfit punishments. The following example illustrates how 
more lenient sentences are not always indicative of a fairer sentencing. 
 Let us think of a case where Driver 1 and Driver 2 are both driving 40 mph on a road 
with signs indicating the speed limit is 25 mph. Driver 1 is driving a red car and Driver 2 is 
driving a black car. The police officer assigned to the area is distracted when Driver 2 drives by 
and Driver 2 continues speeding down he road without facing any penalties. The officer catches 
a glimpse of Driver 1 as he is driving by and notices he is speeding. The officer pulls Driver 1 
over and Driver 1 is given a speeding ticket. 
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 In the case above, it would seem strange to say that Driver 1 was unfairly ticketed just 
because Driver 2 was not ticketed. Driver 1 was clearly speeding and the ticket was well 
deserved. If caught, Driver 2 should also have been given a ticket but due to the inconspicuous 
color of Driver 2’s car and the distracted officer, Driver 2 was not given a ticket. The unfairness 
of this situation stems from systematic problems that exist in implementation. These systematic 
problems resulted in Driver 2 escaping a ticket he actually deserved. Here, Driver 2 received 
unfair favorable treatment as a result of this failure of implementation. Driver 1 actually received 
the proportionally correct penalty for speeding. Improvements in implementation so that the 
penalties for speeding are more fairly administered across the board would be beneficial for this 
particular system in practice, however the penalty itself for speeding still seems appropriate. 
  Just as a speeding ticket penalty for Driver 1 above is not an unfair penalty, capital 
punishment for specific heinous crimes is not an unfair, disproportionate, or cruel form of 
punishment. Capital punishment is indeed an appropriate sentencing for murder convictions. 
Disproportionate sentencing for certain groups simply indicates a failure in implementation. 
Those who are sentenced to death for murder are not being treated unfairly. Rather, those who 
are not sentenced to the death penalty are being treated unfairly leniently. This inappropriate 
lenient sentencing for certain groups over others is an implementation error that must obviously 
be rectified. However, this is an issue for policymakers. Such problems with implementation 
pose no threats for the retributivist theory of punishment. As long as capital punishment meets 
the criteria of lax talionis proportional punishment relative to the immoral action at hand, 
problems with implementation remain of no relevance to the retributivist. 
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 Bedeau also mentions the inevitably of error with the death penalty.37 In practice, no 
system is perfect and there are certainly cases where innocent people are often convicted of 
crimes. Due to the irreversible nature of the death penalty, allowing for this form of punishment 
creates situations where society cannot correct for these inevitable mistakes in conviction. Again, 
this is an issue for policymakers. Policymakers must strive to limit the instances of error. For the 
retributivist, problems of implementation are of no concern as long as the punishments meet the 
appropriate criteria for retributivism. Since this objection would not hold true if a perfect system 
of retributivism were to be devised, the inevitability of errors associated with the death penalty in 
practice is of no concern for the retributivist.   
 Other issues of the death penalty related strictly to policy and not retributivist theory 
include the financial costs, public opinion, and abolition trend of this form of punishment in 
many developed nations.38 Optimal theories of punishment may in reality result in heavy 
financial burdens on nations that attempt to put the theory into practice. Public opinion due to the 
changing social trends may indeed lean towards abolishing death penalty. These same social 
trends may call for governments to abandon punishment by law in the future. These financial and 
social barriers are indeed concerning but are the issues of policy and do not have be taken into 
consideration when formulating a theory of punishment.   
 Bedeau’s expresses his concern with the barbaric nature of capital punishment. There is 
no denying that certain method of fulfilling the death penalty can indeed be perceived as 
barbaric. However, barbaric treatment is not forbidden under the retributivist method of 
punishment as long as the barbaric form of hard treatment does not exceed the level of a 
suffering the criminal inflicted upon his victims. Critics argue that allowing for such harsh hard 	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treatments proves retributivism itself is barbaric and may not function as a feasible system of 
punishment. These same critics argue that advocating for suffering that comes from these 
particularly harmful punishments, as a method of restoring the good, is in itself barbaric.39  
In order to evaluate the validity of these worries, we must first consider how we classify 
certain acts as barbaric. By definition, the term “barbaric” implies that something is primitive or 
uncivilized. The standards of exactly what is considered primitive and civilized changes as time 
progresses and cultures change. As time and culture progresses certain acts that were once 
considered normal or acceptable by society become tabooed. Likewise, certain actions that were 
once considered particularly abhorrent or unacceptable become acceptable. In order for a system 
of punishment to remain feasible it must extend across all cultural and time barriers. 
Retributivism succeeds in this goal by requiring that all immoral actions be punished in a way 
that balances the immoral action even in cases when the punishment must be extreme. Therefore, 
although the Tadros’ worries are appealing they too do not apply to retributivism because 
retributivism is a theory of punishment is not limited to certain notions of barbarism. It is not 
possible to create a system of punishment around what is or what is not considered barbaric 
because of the fickle nature of barbaric punishments. Therefore, it only makes sense to set a 
system of punishments that ignores the nature of punishments itself and focuses instead on the 
functions and reasons for punishments.  
I acknowledge that certain methods of capital punishment could indeed be construed as 
barbaric no matter what the time period or culture. However, barbaric hard treatments would 
only be permissible in cases where the criminal himself performed barbaric actions. In these 	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cases, barbaric treatment is not only a feasible method of punishment but is also arguably a 
necessary method of punishment.  In order to fully balance morality as retributivism requires 
barbaric immoral acts must be balanced with barbaric hard treatment punishments that have the 
power to balance out the magnitude of these actions. Under retributivism, punishment is not 
administered to those who perform only morally good or morally neutral acts. Punishments are 
only administered to those who have performed morally questionable acts. Because barbaric 
treatments are only administered to certain barbaric perpetrators, the barbaric punishments do not 
normalize the nature of the barbaric treatment. Conversely, barbaric punishments highlight the 
unacceptable nature of treating others   
By analyzing the most prominent reasons for abolishing the death penalty, I prove that 
most of the problems arise from issues in implementing policy and evolving social constructs 
rather than from moral considerations relevant for the retributivist. Through this reasoning, I 
prove that the death penalty is not morally objectionable in itself as a form of punishment. 
Because the death penalty has a unique moral capacity that cannot be satisfied by any other form 
of punishment, it is a necessary punishment in any feasible application of retributivism.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 In this work, I seek to provide an explanation for the superiority of retributivism over 
utilitarian and dualist theories. The troubling and inescapable conclusions implied by both 
utilitarian and dualist theories leave retributivism as the only functional theory of justice. By 
addressing and correcting some of the most glaring objections to retributivism, I work to 
strengthen my position that retributivism exists as the most feasible and just system of 
punishment. My intention in this article is not to prove that retributivism is an impeccable theory 
of punishment. I acknowledge that more work must be done before retributivism can be 
acknowledged as the optimal form of punishment. My only intention with this work is to solve 
some of the most glaring problems with retributivism in order to highlight retributivism’s 
potential as the most effective and morally attuned theory of punishment. 
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